Quarterly Updates

After months of tension and uncertainty following the 7/23 killing of two Jordanians at the hands of an Israeli Embassy security guard and the subsequent recall of the Israeli Embassy staff from Amman (see JPS 47 [1] and [2]), the Israeli government t

Ongoing Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war stoked tensions with Israel, testing the uneasy cease-fire in southern Syria that the United States and Russia brokered in the summer of 2017 (see JPS 47 [1] and [2]).

Fueled by pent-up economic and political dissatisfaction, a wave of popular protests swept Iran at the end of 2017.

There was one notable development in the Israeli-Saudi relationship this quarter.

Qatar, still subject to a Saudi-United Arab Emirates boycott (see JPS 47 [1] and [2]), made inroads with the U.S. pro-Israel community this quarter. Following visits from prominent U.S.

David Friedman, Ambassador to Israel

After more than a year of lobbying by U.S. and Israeli diplomats, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) delayed publication of its blacklist of companies operating in Israel’s settlements in the oPt this quarter.

Days after Trump’s 12/6 recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Netanyahu left Israel for Europe where he was scheduled to meet with Macron and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini. “I will not accept a double standard from them,” he told reporters.

Although it suffered a setback last quarter with the indefinite postponement of the AfricaIsrael Summit (see JPS 47 [2]), Netanyahu’s diplomatic outreach campaign on the continent proceeded apace.

The AHLC, the main policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinians, convened in Brussels on 1/31 for an emergency session to discuss “measures to speed up efforts that can underpin a negotiated two-state solution” and the need to “enable the PA to execute full c

Boycott

U.S. pres. Donald Trump continued work on a peace initiative this quarter, without any resolution to lingering uncertainties on key issues (e.g., whether the U.S. should move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem; see JPS 46 [4] and 47 [1]).

Regional events figure heavily in developments this quarter as the Saudi Arabian crown prince steps out of the shadows of secret meetings with Israeli and U.S.

After the flare-up of violence surrounding new Israeli security measures at Haram al-Sharif last quarter, Israeli-Palestinian violence returned to pre-crisis levels. As a result, the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli actions this quarter fell to 21, down from 38.

“HISTORIC COMPROMISE”

The following data come from a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) between 9/14–16/2017. The results are based on a survey of 1,270 Palestinians from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

The Egyptian govt., particularly its intelligence apparatus, was instrumental in brokering the new Palestinian reconciliation agreement. Dir.

Neither the Israeli nor the Jordanian govt. made any effort to restore diplomatic relations after an Israeli security guard killed 2 Jordanians on 7/23 and the Israeli govt.’s subsequent recall of its embassy staff from Amman.

The Israeli govt.’s discontent with last quarter’s U.S- and Russia-backed cease-fire in southwestern Syria, which went into effect on 7/9 (see JPS 47 [1]), persisted throughout the quarter.

Internal Lebanese politics became the focal point of longstanding regional tensions at the end of the quarter (see “Regional Affairs” below).

The growing rift between Iran and its growing sphere of influence, on the one hand, and the Saudi-led so-called Sunni axis, on the other, escalated further this quarter, with unresolved tensions over the previous quarter’s Saudi-led boycott of Qatar, which had repercussions as far away as Lebanon

After mos. of prevarication on the fate of the 7/14/2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Trump took his first major step to abandon the Iran nuclear deal this quarter.

The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, which was sealed with the 2 countries’ 6/27/2016 agreement to normalize relations (see JPS 46 [1]), suffered a setback this quarter because of the 9/25 Kurdish independence referendum.

Amid the shifting regional dynamics, there were signs that Bahrain was ready to normalize its relationship with Israel.

Trump’s Ambassador on Settlements

UNHRC

International soccer’s governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), delivered its final ruling on the Palestinian attempt to get Israel suspended from international competition this quarter.

Despite Israeli and U.S. pressure to delay or suspend the vote, Interpol’s general assembly approved Palestine’s petition for full membership on 9/27, with 75 mbr. states in favor, 24 against, and 34 abstaining.

Following persistent reports of Israeli forces confiscating EU-funded construction materials and demolishing EU-supported infrastructure projects in the West Bank, 8 European govts. signed onto a letter demanding that the Israeli govt. pay them more than €30,000 (approx.

Netanyahu’s outreach efforts on the African continent suffered a setback this quarter. On 9/11, the Jerusalem Post reported that the Africa-Israel Summit, which in many ways was the culmination of Netanyahu’s diplomatic campaign, had been indefinitely postponed.

Boycott

The Ad Hoc Liaison Comm., the main policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinians, convened on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York on 9/18. Hosted by UN undersecy.- gen.

The following data come from a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) between 6/29–7/1/2017. The results are based on a survey of 1,200 Palestinians from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

The IDF continued to interfere in the Syrian civil war this quarter, particularly during one significantly violent week in late 6/2017.

Cairo was in a unique position this quarter at the nexus of otherwise marginally related trends. On the one hand, Pres.