With most diplomatic initiatives stalled, the Palestinian habba (surge or revolt in English) continued to dominate international and local media. However, there was an ebb in characteristic knife attacks, stabbings, and car rammings against Israeli soldiers, settlers, and civilians; carried out by mostly young Palestinians, the series of non-coordinated individual attacks took place in the context of the tightening siege of Gaza, continued abuse of West Bank residents at the hands of settlers and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, unceasing takeover of Palestinian land and homes, and the explosive situation around Haram al-Sharif (see “Jerusalem at Boiling Point,” online supplement to JPS 45 [2]). While there were fewer Palestinian and Israeli casualties this quarter, lingering tension in the oPt centered on Palestinian access to Haram al-Sharif during the Jewish holidays fueled fears of another flare-up.
The ebb in the violence allowed some negotiating space between the 2 sides on lower-level economic and security issues if not on major diplomatic ones. Meanwhile, the Palestinians focused on continuing multilateral diplomatic efforts, particularly the French peace initiative, which took shape this quarter.
REVOLT AND RESPONSE
Having intensified in conjunction with the Jewish holidays in 9/2015, the protests, clashes, and individual attacks that characterized the habba decreased during the quarter, leading to substantially fewer casualties: 32 Palestinians and 2 Israelis were killed as a result of such incidents this quarter, compared with 92 and 16, respectively, the previous quarter. This 66% reduction in overall fatalities followed on a 50% reduction from the previous 3 mos. Likewise, the number of injuries also decreased, from a peak of 7,392 Palestinians in 10/2015, to a monthly average of 2,192 in 11/2015–1/2016, and down to 514 in 2/2016, 348 in 3/2015, and 286 in 4/2016, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Similarly, the number of Israelis injured also decreased this quarter, from 115, 50, 41, and 16 in each of the 4 mos. leading up to 1/2016; to 8 in 2/2016, 27 in 3/2016, and 21 in 4/2016.
As in the previous 2 quarters, individual incidents—stabbings, alleged/staged stabbings, vehicular collisions, and car rammings, as well as shootings, largely instigated by Palestinian youths—produced most of the casualties. Conflicting Palestinian and Israeli media coverage of these events continued to exacerbate underlying tensions and anti-Israeli attacks garnered much support among the Palestinian public (see “Palestinian Opinion” below). With the number of individual incidents decreasing, however, a handful of high-profile events drove unrest during the quarter.
The most prominent incident occurred in Hebron on 3/24, when IDF troops shot and killed 2 Palestinians after they allegedly stabbed and moderately injured an Israeli soldier in the Old City. The killings would likely not have stood out had a Palestinian human rights activist not captured 1 on video. The footage of an IDF soldier shooting a Palestinian in the head after he had been disarmed, detained, and incapacitated sparked an international outcry. Palestinian officials, who had been condemning the extrajudicial nature of IDF responses to similar incidents, said the footage demonstrated the disproportionate violence meted out by the Israeli army over the previous 5 mos. After the footage circulated on social media, some Israeli officials also condemned the killing, and PM Benjamin Netanyahu authorized an internal investigation into the incident. However, the govt.’s response was in stark contrast to Israeli public reaction. The Palestinian human rights activist who filmed the killing received death threats and other forms of harassment over the following weeks, and Israel’s Channel 2 News published a poll, on 3/26, showing that 57% of the Israeli public opposed their govt.’s efforts to prosecute the shooter, Elor Azaria. Ultimately, an IDF tribunal downgraded (3/31) the charges from murder to manslaughter, and Azaria’s trial began on 5/9. (See Photos from the Quarter.)
Although there were fewer anti-Israeli Palestinian attacks during this quarter, the Israeli govt. ramped up its ongoing crackdown, and, as in previous quarters, continued its policy of withholding the bodies of Palestinians killed after allegedly perpetrating violence against Israelis. This policy continued to provoke Palestinian ire, particularly in East Jerusalem, and it also stirred controversy within the Israeli govt. When the quarter opened, Israeli police had returned only 1 Palestinian’s body to his family in East Jerusalem. During the 1st half of the quarter, they returned 3 more (the family rejected 1 on the grounds that it had been frozen, violating the terms of an agreement with the Israeli authorities).
In the second half of the quarter, the policy came under question amid an ongoing dispute between DM Moshe Ya’alon and Public Security Min. Gilad Erdan, who held jurisdiction over Palestinian corpses withheld from families in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, respectively. Ya’alon and the majority of Israel’s security establishment espoused a more lenient attitude, believing that withholding corpses only led to more violence, while Erdan and the Israeli police enforced strict restrictions on any returns and placed caps on the size of funerals. According to sources in his office, on 3/28, Netanyahu ordered Ya’alon to stop returning any bodies to the PA or families in the West Bank but neglected to explain the order, leading to its inconsistent application (e.g., a body was returned to Hebron on 4/15). The next mo., Netanyahu appeared to reverse his position, saying (5/4) that Ya’alon and Erdan had been empowered, as of 5/1, to decide whether or not to return any bodies. As of 5/9, the Israeli authorities were still withholding the bodies of 15 Palestinians, according to OCHA.
The Israeli govt. expanded its crackdown in other ways during the quarter. On 3/2, Netanyahu formally asked Atty. Gen. Avichai Mandelblit to approve his proposed policy of deporting to Gaza families of Palestinians who commit serious crimes against Israelis. Then, after 7 Palestinians and 1 U.S. citizen were killed in a series of attacks on 3/8–9, he said (3/9) that Israel would complete the construction of the separation wall in the s. Hebron hills and that he would pursue legislation aimed at deterring Palestinians from entering Israel illegally (1 of the attacks, on 3/8, was carried out by a Palestinian working in Israel without proper permits); the PM also pledged to shut down Palestinian media outlets that in his view incited violence and to deny work permits to the families of Palestinians who committed serious crimes against Israelis.
Over the next few weeks, Netanyahu’s proposals took effect: Israeli forces shut down (3/10) Falastin al-yawm in Ramallah; conducted (3/10) widespread raids inside Israel, arresting over 250 Palestinians without proper permits and 27 Israelis suspected of assisting them; ordered (3/14) the closure of a construction site near Haifa on charges of harboring Palestinians; and closed down (3/31) a factory in the Negev that employed Palestinians working in Israel illegally. Israel’s security cabinet approved (3/10) Netanyahu’s proposal to complete the separation wall near Hebron (work had largely stopped since 2007). By 4/15, hundreds of Palestinian work permits had reportedly been revoked for security reasons. Additionally, the Knesset passed (3/14) into law, 44–16, an amendment designed to deter Israelis from transporting, employing, or otherwise assisting Palestinians working in Israel illegally. Specifically, the law imposes fines of up to NIS 75,000 (around $19,340) and prison sentences of up to 2 years for 1st-time infractions by Israelis convicted of employing or otherwise accommodating Palestinians, with punishments increasing for more serious infractions. Police were also authorized to shut down offending businesses for as many as 30 days. In addition, the new policies empowered courts to extend closures or cancel permits.
The Israeli govt. also increased efforts to marginalize or undermine political opponents, including Israeli anti-occupation activists, other left-wing civil society groups, and Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI). After its introduction last quarter (see JPS 45 [3]), the Knesset passed, 55–53 (3/28), the 1st reading of the “suspension bill,” which would allow a 3/4 majority of Knesset mbrs. (MKs) to suspend 1 of their colleagues if he or she incited terror or racism, or otherwise undermined Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (Netanyahu spearheaded the bill after criticizing 3 Palestinian MKs for visiting the East Jerusalem family of a Palestinian whose body was being withheld by the Israeli govt.). In a related development, Israel’s Interior Ministry revoked (5/10) the residency status of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement leader Omar Barghouti, effectively barring him from traveling abroad. The ministry alleged that his “center of life” was in the West Bank and not his family home in Acre. Furthermore, the Israeli govt. approved (4/10) a phased plan to strengthen law enforcement in the so-called Arab sector. The plan would invest billions of NIS into the construction of 10 new police stations, the renovation of 10 more, and the hiring of 2,600 new police officers by 2020. Erdan, the plan’s chief designer, said it would narrow the social gaps between Palestinians and Jews in Israel and increase economic integration, but the PCI and their representatives criticized the plan for serving the state’s needs, rather than those of the Palestinian minority.
Meanwhile, Channel 2 aired a report (3/17) claiming that the anti-occupation group Breaking the Silence routinely collected classified military intelligence over the course of its work, which included interviewing former IDF troops about their experiences. Netanyahu criticized (3/17) the group and Ya’alon ordered an investigation into the allegations. According to an Israeli security official (3/23), Shin Bet completed a preliminary probe into the report and found that Breaking the Silence collected only low-level classified military intelligence. Public outcry against the group continued throughout the quarter.
Further exacerbating tensions in the West Bank, the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) resumed its practice of punitively cutting the power supply to various Palestinian cities in response to unpaid debts. From 3/31 to 4/5, the IEC temporarily cut power to parts of Jericho (3/31), large swaths of Bethlehem (4/4), and parts of Hebron (4/5; see Chronology for details). IEC officials said (4/4) that the PA and the Jerusalem District Electricity Company (JDECO) owed NIS 1.7 b. (around $449 m.) to the Israeli govt., with the PA allegedly owing NIS 300,000 and JDECO the remaining NIS 1.4 b. After a series of negotiations between Israel’s main political parties, including Joint List chair Ayman Odeh, the IEC announced (4/6) that the power cuts had been indefinitely suspended. JDECO agreed to pay NIS 60 m. ($15.7 m.) to the IEC by 4/12, and the PA immediately transferred NIS 20 m. ($5.2 m.). They also agreed to resolve disputes over tariffs and interest rates in future negotiations. Although the power cuts ended, and Israel’s High Court of Justice temporarily banned (4/20) the IEC from using this form of punishment, the looming threat of punitive reductions in other public services fueled Palestinian unrest.
PRESSURE INCREASES IN JERUSALEM AND GAZA
Tension at Haram al-Sharif
Although violence decreased overall during this 3-mo. period, 2 major flashpoints at the end of the quarter threatened to break the uneasy, relative calm. The 1st arose in Jerusalem with the approach of the Passover holiday. Since Palestinian access to Haram al-Sharif during the Jewish holidays was the initial trigger for unrest in 9/2015, nervous anticipation increased among govt. officials and in media reports in late 4/2016. Right-wing Jewish activists’ visits to Haram al-Sharif, Israeli arrest raids and house searches in Palestinian neighborhoods, and Israeli settlement growth in the city all continued apace. Another source of tension centered on stalled Israeli-Jordanian talks over the implementation of a 10/24/2015 agreement to install new surveillance infrastructure at the sanctuary. Scant and conflicting reports of progress appeared during the quarter, but neither side seemed eager to compromise.
The sticking points had become clear early in the quarter. On 2/28, senior Jordanian and Israeli officials said negotiators had made progress and that a delegation of Jordanian technicians would soon arrive in Jerusalem to finalize technical details. The 2 sides concurred on a couple of main points: cameras would be placed in the large plazas and other outdoor locations around the sanctuary, but not inside al-Aqsa Mosque as Israel had requested; they would also broadcast simultaneously to Israeli and Jordanian control rooms. However, disagreements remained. Jordanian officials said that the cameras would live-stream activity around the sanctuary but Israeli officials denied this. In the wake of these reports, another Jordanian official denied (2/29) any talks were going on at all and almost 1 mo. passed before further details were made public.
Three weeks later, Jordanian minister of state for media affairs and communications Mohammad Momani said (3/18) that cameras would be installed shortly, and the minister of awqaf and Islamic affairs Hayel Dawood indicated (3/20) that Jordan planned to set up 55 cameras to monitor only the outdoor areas of the sanctuary, reiterating that the cameras would broadcast live over the Internet. Since no Israeli officials commented on these reports, it was unclear whether they represented new understandings or if Jordanian officials were merely restating their positions. Despite more such reports based solely on Jordanian comments, the overall lack of tangible progress increased tensions. The International Crisis Group, for example, reported (4/7) that the “relative calm” at Haram al-Sharif was “deceiving,” and that it could “crumble” unless Jordan and Israel implemented their agreement to install cameras, making “no other measures” possible.
Ultimately, PM Abdullah Ensour said (4/18) that Jordan had decided to halt camera installation at Haram al-Sharif, citing Palestinian complaints and reservations. Further reports said that Jordan planned to hire 150 additional inspectors to work for the Islamic Waqf instead. An Israeli official responded (4/19) to the announcement, saying that “Israel’s support [for the initiative] remains unchanged,” and that it was “regrettable” that the PA did not support the plan.
In the absence of a final agreement on surveillance, tension escalated throughout 4/2016. The Israeli messianic extremist organization Temple Institute said (4/12) that it had secretly conducted a Jewish wedding at the sanctuary that morning, violating the ban on Jewish religious ceremonies there. After MK Jamal Zahalka (Joint List) called (4/14) for Palestinians to obstruct Jews’ visits to Haram al-Sharif during Passover, Netanyahu formally asked Mandelblit if Zahalka’s comments constituted “incitement,” which would be grounds for an ethical complaint and a potential suspension. Israel’s police commissioner then wrote (4/17) to Netanyahu saying that he had “decided to continue [the PM’s] ban on [MKs] going up to [Haram al-Sharif] until further notice.” In the 3 days leading up to the start of Passover on 3/22, Israeli forces conducted intense raids across East Jerusalem, arresting 52 Palestinians, issuing arrest summons to 18, and sparking clashes that led to at least 16 Palestinian injuries. The Israeli authorities also placed restrictions on Palestinian travel during the holiday: Gazans’ weekly visits to Jerusalem were suspended; West Bank and Gazan border crossings were closed on 4/22–30, except for emergency medical or humanitarian cases; and al-Ibrahimi Mosque was closed on 4/25–26.
Passover, which Jewish Israelis observed from 4/22–4/30, came and went with relatively little violence. Every day of the Passover week saw verbal or physical clashes at Haram al-Sharif between right-wing Jewish activists and Palestinian worshippers (see Chronology for details). Hundreds of Jews toured the sanctuary, and many were arrested or expelled after attempting to perform religious rites in contravention of long-standing practice. Overall, no serious injuries were reported, and life in the city returned to a relative calm.
Cross-Border Violence in Gaza
Since the Israeli assault on Gaza in summer 2014 (see JPS 44 [2]), sporadic bouts of crossborder violence have repeatedly broken the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. While internationally mediated efforts to negotiate a long-term truce, or hudna, failed, neither side appeared willing to instigate another large-scale military operation. At the same time, reconstruction efforts advanced slowly (see “Gaza Reconstruction” below), humanitarian conditions in Gaza continued to deteriorate, and officials on both sides were voicing increasingly bellicose rhetoric.
This quarter, another round of cross-border violence broke out, contributing to overall tension across the oPt that illustrates the fragility of the cease-fire. On 4/18, the Israeli govt. lifted its gag order on news that the IDF had recently discovered a tunnel leading from Gaza into s. Israel (they destroyed the tunnel on 4/19). The news was released in the context of death of some 12 Palestinians in tunnel-related incidents last quarter, raising new questions about Hamas’s intentions and Israel’s anti-tunneling capabilities. Hamas’s military wing responded (4/18), by describing the tunnel concerned as “just a drop in the ocean of what the resistance has prepared for the defense of its people and the liberation of holy places, land, and prisoners.” Two weeks later, Netanyahu toured (5/3) an area along Gaza’s border, igniting a 5-day period of sustained violence that led to the death of 1 Palestinian and the injury of 4 others (see Chronology for details). Armed Palestinians fired rifles and mortars at Israeli forces along the border fence on a daily basis, and the IDF used artillery and air strikes against Hamas and Islamic Jihad positions across Gaza. The IDF also conducted unspecified operations in their unilaterally defined buffer zone on Gaza’s side of the border that were presumed to be antitunneling activities. The worst attacks came on 5/5, the day the IDF announced that it had captured and interrogated a Hamas fighter and discovered another tunnel.
After 5 days of violence, Hamas and Israel reportedly agreed (5/7) on de-escalating the tension, following diplomatic overtures by Hamas toward Egypt, Qatar, and the UN (although it remained unclear whether the latter had any role in mediating the agreement) and relative calm returned to the border. Israeli officials said (5/8) that they planned to continue anti-tunnel operations, and they lifted (5/10) another gag order on the news that a 2d Hamas operative had been captured and interrogated, but there was no resumption of violence.
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI TALKS
With violence subsiding across Israel and the oPt, Israeli and Palestinian officials embarked on several bilateral initiatives, making progress on new, lower-level economic and security arrangements, if not on the diplomatic front.
Diplomacy
Neither the Palestinian leadership nor the Netanyahu govt. altered their positions on resuming bilateral negotiations this quarter: PA pres. Abbas maintained that Israel would have to halt settlement construction and release the 4th batch of Palestinian prisoners as agreed to in the previous round of U.S.-mediated talks in 3–4/2014 (see JPS 43 [3]), while Netanyahu insisted that there would be no direct talks unless the Palestinians dropped their preconditions and restored “quiet” in the oPt (see JPS 45 [3]). With progress stalled diplomatically, both Israelis and Palestinians pursued other initiatives (see below).
One noteworthy incident in early 4/2016 summed up the state of play. Without altering his stance on the previously formulated minimum conditions for talks to resume, on 3/31 Abbas indicated that he would be open to meeting with Netanyahu “anywhere, anytime.” In response, the Israeli PM invited (4/4) Abbas for a meeting in Jerusalem, adding “any day he can come, I’ll be here.” Netanyahu’s Twitter account posted a message later that day elaborating on the invitation: “I heard Pres. Abbas say that if I invite him to meet, he’ll come. So I’m inviting him. I’ve cleared my schedule.” The PLO Negotiations Affairs Dept. Twitter account responded with “Negotiate what exactly?” The ostensible transparency of the exchange revealed both sides’ eagerness to appear open to talks and their simultaneous unwillingness to compromise, at least in public. This quarter witnessed no major information leaks of secret Israeli-Palestinian talks.
Economics
Early in the quarter, reports surfaced that Israel’s finance minister, Moshe Kahlon, had held talks with his PA counterpart, Shukri Bishara, to shore up the economy in the oPt. On 2/21, the Israeli press reported that the 2 officials had met several times in recent weeks and that Kahlon was preparing a series of recommendations for Netanyahu, including 1 that would permit Palestinian doctors to train at Israeli hospitals and Palestinian entrepreneurs to apprentice with Israeli technology companies. Kahlon then met with Netanyahu on 2/24, and the PM allegedly approved several steps to improve Palestinian economic security, including a direct transfer of NIS 500 m. (around $128 m.) in withheld tax revenues to alleviate the PA’s reported NIS 1.5 b. (around $384 m.) debt.
On 4/12, the IDF’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Unit announced that it had approved a Palestinian request to build a power plant near Jenin. According to COGAT, the plant would produce “a qualitative shift in electricity consumption, which will have a positive impact on all aspects of life.” A senior Palestinian official said (4/12) that the plant would cover 50% of the West Bank’s electricity needs. The project was estimated to cost $620 m., with an expected completion date of 2019. The plant’s fuel is to come from Israel’s offshore Leviathan natural gas field.
Separately, Israeli political and military officials were alleged to be discussing opening a seaport off Gaza’s coast, according to a report in Haaretz on 2/24. Netanyahu and Ya’alon opposed the proposal, but senior IDF officers favored it, especially if Hamas pledged to uphold the cease-fire in exchange. There was no further progress on the seaport proposal, although it did come up in Turkish-Israeli reconciliation talks this quarter (see “Turkey” below).
Security Coordination
Despite increasing unpopularity among the Palestinian public, PA Security Forces (PASF) maintained their security coordination arrangement with the IDF in the mos. that followed the eruption of the habba in 9/2015 (see “Palestinian Opinion” below). Palestinian efforts to renegotiate the terms of security coordination came to light this quarter as the PA sought to alleviate pressures from the Israeli crackdown on West Bank Palestinian cities and to quell the violence. According to a report in Haaretz on 3/14, the Israeli govt. and the PA had held secret talks on reducing the IDF’s presence in Area A, comprising 18% of the West Bank, slated to be under full PA administrative and security control. At the 1st meeting, on 2/9, senior Palestinian officials had reportedly issued an ultimatum: end IDF operations in Area A or we will end security coordination. In response, their IDF counterparts advanced a proposal that would have limited such operations, starting with Ramallah and Jericho as testing grounds. The proposal was apparently approved higher up in the chain of command, but then Netanyahu and Ya’alon demanded that it include Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right to operate in Area A to stop “bomb-ticking cases,” or Israeli-defined emergencies. That demand proved to be the sticking point for the PA, since it would have contravened Oslo Accord provisions establishing Areas A, B, and C.
Despite the Palestinians’ rejection of the initial Israeli proposal, negotiations on security arrangements continued with Israeli officials and Western diplomats saying on 4/6 that progress had been made. But according to reports on 4/18, Shin Bet opposed the talks, and the wider Israeli security establishment was unwilling to make any major compromises to its initial position. Netanyahu and Ya’alon said (4/20) that, no matter what, the IDF would “maintain the possibility of entering Area A, and anywhere necessary, according to operational needs.” On 5/3, PLO secy.-gen. Saeb Erakat said that the talks were stalled because Israel refused to allow the PASF to take over full security control in Area A, and also because of Israel’s response to the French peace initiative (see below). Under growing public pressure from the Palestinian public, the PLO Exec. Comm. decided the very next day to curtail security coordination with Israel. PASF troops were instructed to implement the decision “under supervision of the Palestinian political echelon,” and PA security agencies were given responsibility for deciding how best to proceed. On 5/7, a Fatah official elaborated on the decision saying that the comm. would reconsider if Israel pledged to end incursions into Area A.
It remained unclear how serious the PA and PASF were about modifying the security coordination arrangement. On 5/4, senior IDF officers reported that the PASF had been taking a more active role in stopping the ongoing violence. They said Palestinian troops were responsible for around 40% of all arrests of Palestinians suspected of committing serious crimes against Israelis in recent mos., marking a 30% increase over the figure they reported in 1/2016.
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY
At the same time the Israeli govt. was advancing economic and security talks with the Palestinians, it was also expanding and strengthening its settlements in the West Bank. Frequent reports of new settlement construction and confiscations of Palestinian land for the purpose of expanding settlements appeared throughout the quarter, making a mockery of Netanyahu’s expressions of support for a 2-state solution.
On 3/29, the Knesset passed the 1st reading of 2 bills providing economic incentives for settlement growth. The 1st bill would reduce bureaucratic restrictions on home purchases in settlements, ensuring that settlers did not pay taxes to both the govt. and the Civil Admin. The second would entitle settlers to tax breaks if they were eligible for a capital investment grant.
In terms of confiscations, the Israeli authorities seized 2,342 dunams (580 acres) near Jericho (3/10) and 115 dunams (28 acres) near Salfit (4/21), describing the 2 areas as state land; notified (4/22) Palestinians living near Nablus of the decision to confiscate 5,000 dunams (1,250 acres) of land nearby, retroactively authorizing a number of settlement outposts; and, according to a PA official on 3/21, residents of the Nablus area were informed that a further 1,200 dunams (around 296.5 acres) would be confiscated for the benefit of the nearby Eli settlement. (COGAT later disputed the figure, saying that only 612 dunams were set to be confiscated.)
In terms of new settlement construction, Israeli NGO Peace Now revealed (4/12) that the govt. had advanced plans for 674 new settler residences in the 1st 3 mos. of 2016, marking a 250% increase over the comparable period in 2015. The next day, the Israeli press reported that Netanyahu and Ya’alon had recently approved the construction of 267 new settler residences across the West Bank but Netanyahu’s office denied (4/14) the reports, saying “almost all of the permits are intended for the upgrading of existing buildings.” Peace Now disproved that claim with photographic evidence. Later, Haaretz published (5/7) a leaked govt. plan for a new settlement near the illegal Amona outpost, scheduled for evacuation by the end of 2016. The plan was reportedly being advanced to stem criticism from settlers and defenders of Amona who had waged a campaign to win authorization for the outpost.
In a related development, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled (3/2) that the govt. must return 1,700 dunams (around 420 acres) of unused land near Ramallah to its Palestinian owners whose lawyers had argued that the govt. seized the land in the late 1970s and early 1980s with plans to establish settlements but had never used it.
BROADER DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES
Palestinians’ Unilateral Efforts
As they focused their energies on the French peace initiative (see below) for much of the quarter, the Palestinians also maintained ongoing efforts in international institutions, particularly at the UN Security Council (UNSC).
Last quarter, the Palestinian leadership appeared to be preparing to abandon efforts to table a UNSC res. censuring Israel’s settlements in favor of supporting France’s peace initiative. With the U.S. veto the chief obstacle at the UNSC, the Palestinians settled for the promise of the U.S. admin. throwing its weight behind the French initiative before leaving office in 1/2017. Secy. of State John Kerry made it clear to Erakat on 2/21 that the U.S. would veto any UNSC res. censuring Israeli settlement policy or recognizing Palestinian statehood, but the Palestinian leadership nevertheless went ahead and informally circulated a draft to that effect in early 4/2016. Haaretz said (4/7) Western diplomats and Palestinian officials regarded the document as “relatively moderate,” indicating that it was seen as a compromise measure, combining a draft UNSC presidential statement elaborated by the Palestinians in 2/2011 (see JPS 40 [4]) with an added provision criticizing Israeli settler-related violence. The officials also indicated that Abbas was hoping to bring the draft to a vote while in New York for a climate conference in late 4/2016. Contrary to what Kerry had conveyed to Erakat on 2/21, a spokesperson for the State Dept. said (4/8) that the Obama admin. was undecided on whether or not to support the draft, allowing the Palestinian campaign to garner further support unimpeded.
Over the next 2 weeks, as consultations with several Arab states and other allies intensified, with the aim of finalizing the Palestinian draft ahead of Abbas’s trip to New York, the U.S. firmly dispelled any lingering ambiguity over its stance and closed the door on the draft res. After 90% of the U.S. House of Reps. (394 mbrs.) signed (4/8) a letter calling on U.S. pres. Barack Obama to “oppose, and if need be, veto, one-sided UNSC resolutions,” a State Dept. spokesperson updated (4/12) the U.S. position, saying that the admin. was “opposed to [the Palestinians’ draft].”
The U.S. stance sparked rumors that the Palestinians were shelving their draft. Although the PA Foreign Ministry later denied (4/20) this, a senior Palestinian official was quoted (4/19) as saying deliberations continued on whether or not to halt the campaign. “The opportunity to go to the [UNSC] will always be there,” the official said,“and we want to give a chance to the French initiative because, in the end, this is an initiative that serves us and not one that hurts us.” At the time, French diplomats were reportedly arguing that there was no point in investing time and effort in a draft res. that would likely fail, due to lack of support or a U.S. veto.
The Palestinians continued denying that they were abandoning their UNSC efforts, but when Abbas arrived in New York and addressed the UN on 4/22, he made no announcement or push for a vote: “We are deliberating with international parties and [the] relevant Arab ministerial committee to examine the content and timing for proposing a [UNSC] res. against settlement activity.” Abbas faced criticism from within Fatah and from Hamas, but held his ground. A PLO spokesperson later confirmed (4/26) speculation that Abbas had decided to concentrate Palestinian efforts on the French initiative. There were no further reports about a Palestinian-backed UNSC res. through the end of the quarter Outside the UN umbrella, the Palestinians continued cooperating with the preliminary examination into alleged war crimes committed in the oPt that International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda launched in 1/2015 (see JPS 44 [3]). ICC officials visited the region in 3/2016, meeting with Palestinian activists and lawyers, as well as PA officials on 3/19–21 in Amman. The Palestinians reportedly presented evidence relating to settlements and settler-related violence and to the environmental damage caused by Israel and its appropriation of natural resources. A PA official indicated (3/25) that the Palestinian leadership was trying to secure access to the Gaza Strip for the ICC delegation after Israel had denied them passage through the Erez border crossing. The PA began working with Egypt to get the delegates through the Rafah border crossing instead.
In a related development, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague announced (3/15) that the State of Palestine had joined its ranks, making it the 118th mbr. state. PCA membership allows the Palestinians to access new international dispute resolution services, such as guest tribunals and commissions of inquiry. The Palestinians filed their application to join on 12/29/2015, and their lobbying efforts overcame opposition from the U.S. and Canada. Israel’s Foreign Ministry criticized the announcement: “This is a legal body which is not among the more important ones. What a waste that the Palestinians continue to invest efforts to be accepted into these kinds of bodies instead of returning to the negotiating table.”
French Initiative
In the absence of any serious Israeli moves toward bilateral negotiations, the Palestinian leadership threw its full support behind the French peace initiative this quarter. Major uncertainties hampered French efforts in the past, but as the initiative took on clearer contours, it gathered momentum, and the only remaining questions concerned U.S. participation and Israeli approval.
As the quarter opened, French diplomats were meeting with their counterparts all over the world to build support for their initiative. On 2/16, French amb. to Israel Patrick Maisonnave unveiled the details of the plan to Israeli officials: first, the French would hold consultations with the Israelis and Palestinians in 2–3/2016; second, they would convene an international support group in Paris with reps. from dozens of countries excluding Palestine and Israel in 3/2016 or 4/2016; and last, they would convene an international peace summit in 6/2016 or 7/2016 to launch a new round of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The Israelis did not embrace the proposal; Netanyahu called (2/16) it “puzzling.” The U.S. was more open. After Abbas advocated for the plan in a meeting with Kerry on 2/21, the chief U.S. diplomat said (2/24) that “we’re trying to get some details of what exactly [the French proposal] is trying to achieve and how and what . . . the rules of the road would be.”
As support for the initiative grew in 3/2016 and 4/2016—an Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said (3/3) there was “no doubt” that Cairo welcomed it—the French further clarified their plans. FM Jean-Marc Ayrault reversed his predecessor’s position the previous quarter, saying on 3/9 that if the initiative failed, France would no longer plan to recognize Palestinian statehood. “There is never anything automatic,” he said, adding that “[the initiative] will be the first step, there is no prerequisite.” Israeli officials had criticized former French FM Laurent Fabius’s ultimatum, and the new position was framed as a clear appeal for their support. Abbas met (4/15) with French pres. François Hollande in Paris and dropped the Palestinian bid to have the UNSC pass a res. censuring Israeli settlements (see above).
While they pushed hard for its support, the French did not find a receptive audience in the Israeli govt., even after dropping the recognition ultimatum. Updating the Israelis on 4/21, the French revealed that under their plan, they would: hold a preparatory meeting in early 5/2016; send invitations out for a ministerial-level conference to be held in Paris on 5/30; and get the conferees to agree on a statement of principles to guide the new round of talks. That same day, Ayrault gave an interview to Haaretz emphasizing the importance of Russian and U.S. participation and that of security arrangements at the venue. But their efforts were for naught. On 4/28, Netanyahu’s office released a statement formally rejecting the French peace initiative. “Israel is ready immediately to begin direct negotiations with the Palestinians without any preconditions,” the statement said, adding that “any other diplomatic initiative distances the Palestinians from the table of direct negotiations.”
Despite Israel’s rejection, the French continued to appeal for U.S. support. Toward the end of the quarter, a State Dept. spokesperson said (4/28) that the Obama admin. had not yet taken a position although it was “certainly interested in talking . . . about ways in which we can try to get to a 2-state solution.” Kerry, still undecided about whether he would attend the ministerial meeting or not, met with Ayrault in Paris on 5/9, and asked for the plan to be postponed, purportedly to accommodate his schedule. Ayrault was receptive, confirming (5/15) that the French were pursuing their plans despite Netanyahu’s objections, and that he was open to postponing his 5/30 conference to enable Kerry to attend.