Turkish-Israeli reconciliation talks, resumed in 11/2015 after over 6 mos. of interruption (see JPS 45 [3]), stalled again this quarter. The 2 sides failed to overcome their differences on major issues, specifically, Turkey’s demand that Israel ease the Gaza blockade and the corresponding Israeli demand that Turkey stop enabling Hamas. The talks were placed on further indefinite hold by an upheaval in internal Turkish politics.
As the quarter opened, Turkish and Israeli representatives had just met (2/10–11) and expectations ran high. FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said (2/22) that reconciliation was practically at hand and that he expected the 2 sides to issue a joint statement in the “coming days.” However, lingering disagreements soon became apparent. After a Hamas official had expressed hope (2/25) that Turkish-Israeli reconciliation would result in a seaport being opened off the Gazan coast, Israel’s COGAT commander Mordechai clarified (2/26) that such a plan was not a part of the talks. Although Turkish negotiators were vocal about an easing of the Israeli blockade on Gaza, they did not mention a seaport.
Turkish-Israeli relations faced additional international pressures, especially in the wake of an attack in Istanbul on 3/19, allegedly the work of ISIS. First, on 2/18, Russia’s FM Sergey Lavrov had met with the dir. gen. of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Dore Gold, to clarify Moscow’s reservations about the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation process, in the context of already tense Russian-Turkish relations since Turkey had downed a Russian jet over Syria in 11/2015. In addition, Moscow was reportedly concerned that it might lose its role as Turkey’s chief energy supplier. On 3/19, when a suicide bombing in c. Istanbul killed 5 people, including 3 Israelis, and injured another 36 people, rumors immediately started swirling that the attack might have deliberately targeted the Israeli victims. Netanyahu disclosed (3/19) that he had ordered an investigation into the matter and within 2 days, Turkish media reports said as much. Israel’s Counterterrorism Bureau issued (3/21) a travel warning to Israelis visiting Turkey and Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan eventually sent Israel’s pres. Reuven Rivlin a letter of condolence. The 2 leaders agreed (3/23) to cooperate on counterterrorism efforts, but heightened tensions slowed the next round of Israeli-Turkish reconciliation talks.
In secret messages to the Israeli govt. in late 3/2016, Erdoğan reportedly expressed his desire for a deal to be reached quickly (Haaretz, 4/8), and the 2 sides prepared to meet again in 4/2016. Erdoğan reiterated the position in a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington on 3/31, and indicated that he wanted Israel to “remove the embargo” on Gaza and allow Turkey to supply electricity to the territory via a power generator ship. Soon afterward, a Turkish delegation led by the undersecy. at the Foreign Ministry, Feridun Sinirlioğlu, met with their Israeli counterparts, led by Netanyahu’s personal envoy, Joseph Ciechanover, and the acting chair of Israel’s National Security Council, Jacob Nagel. After the meeting, held in London on the evening of 4/7, an Israeli official denied (4/7) that there were plans to allow Turkey special access to Gaza. Despite the absence of any significant breakthrough, a Turkish Foreign Ministry statement indicated (4/8) that progress had been made and that there would be an agreement “very soon.”
Through the end of the quarter, Israeli and Turkish officials insisted that the major outstanding issues had been resolved and that an agreement could be finalized during the round of talks set for mid-5/2016. Further raising expectations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) advised the Israeli govt. that it would then be allowed to open offices at the alliance’s Brussels headquarters and secure credentials for its diplomats. Since Turkey had blocked Israel from participating in any NATO initiatives in 2010, the Israeli govt. interpreted the move as an indication of Ankara’s commitment to reconciliation.
The 5/2016 talks were indefinitely postponed, however, after Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoğlu announced (5/5) that he would be stepping down. A general election was called for 5/22, and the new govt. would be the one to carry on with the reconciliation process.
Seven mos. after resuming in 11/2015 (see JPS 45 [3]), the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation process culminated in a formal agreement this quarter. The 2 sides overcame the remaining sticking points hampering the talks—Turkey’s demand that Israel ease its blockade on Gaza and Israel’s demand that Turkey stop enabling Hamas (see JPS 45 [4]). Champions of the deal on both sides faced significant obstacles in shepherding the final agreement through.
At the end of last quarter, the negotiations had been postponed indefinitely amid a reshuffle in Turkey’s political leadership. About 3 weeks after PM Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned on 5/5, his replacement, Binali Yildirim, took office. Israel viewed the move as a positive sign for the reconciliation process, given Yildirim’s reputation as a close ally of Turkish pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The new PM reinforced that perception when he said (5/24) that his govt. would be pursuing a new foreign policy based on having “more friends than enemies.”
Over the next mo., other announcements and comments by Turkish and Israeli officials provided further indications that the new govt. would back reconciliation. On 5/30, PM Netanyahu told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation that a deal with Turkey was very close. Sources involved in the meeting reported him as saying that he was waiting for Ankara to set a date for a final, decisive meeting. On the same day, Turkish dep. PM Numan Kurtulmuş said that 2 of Turkey’s 3 major conditions had been met, without specifying what these were. Then, Erdoğan removed 2 senior officials close to the talks: Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu was promoted from undersecy. for foreign affairs to UN amb. while Hakan Fidan, a known opponent of the talks and the head of Turkey’s national intelligence organization, was made amb. to Japan. Israeli diplomatic officials said (6/4) that Sinirlioğlu was the chief Turkish architect of the talks and that his promotion, along with Fidan’s removal, signaled Erdoğan’s confidence that the final deal was imminent (YNet, 6/4).
International and regional opposition to the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation receded in early 6/2016. In a meeting with Netanyahu, Russian pres. Vladimir Putin reversed (6/7) Moscow’s earlier position, saying he now “welcome[d]” Turkish-Israeli rapprochement as a “positive matter.” Russian-Turkish relations had been strained since Turkish forces downed a Russian jet over Syria in 11/2015, and Putin had reportedly been wary of Erdoğan’s gathering stature as a result of improving relations with Israel. Although Turkey’s efforts to mollify Hamas were not as productive, Hamas did not upend the momentum toward a deal. On 6/22, Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that his deputies would continue meeting with Hamas officials in the context of their broader efforts to promote peace in the region, notwithstanding the reconciliation talks with Israel. He also said that Turkey’s relationship with Hamas was not an obstacle to the process. Not long after, however, a dispute emerged between the 2 over Ankara’s pledge to get Israel to loosen its siege on Gaza. The dispute did not escalate beyond allegations and counter-allegations, however. Also, Erdoğan met (6/24) with Hamas leader Khalid Mishal 2 days before a round of IsraeliTurkish talks were scheduled, and while no details were released, the 2 reportedly discussed the blockade on Gaza and the upcoming negotiations.
Ultimately, officials announced a final agreement in Rome on 6/27, concluding the 9-mo. Israeli-Turkish reconciliation process. According to an Israeli official on 6/26, a compromise on the final sticking point—Hamas activities in Turkey—was reached 10 days earlier when the Turkish govt. pledged to allow Hamas to operate in Turkey only for diplomatic purposes, and not to use the country as a staging ground for military activity against Israel. The rest of the deal included: the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations; the resumption of bilateral talks on military cooperation and intelligence sharing; Ankara’s agreement to drop its demands for Israel to lift its blockade on Gaza; Turkey resuming aid to Gaza; Israel allowing Turkey to build a new power plant, desalination plant, and hospital in Gaza; Israel transferring more than $20 m. to a Turkish humanitarian fund for the families of Turkish nationals injured or killed in the IDF assault on the Gaza aid flotilla in 5/2010 (see JPS 40 [1]); and Turkey terminating all legal proceedings related to the flotilla attack. The 2 sides also agreed to begin talks on the prospects for building a gas pipeline in the e. Mediterranean.
Both sides moved quickly to implement the agreement. After the dir. gen. of Israel’s Foreign Ministry signed it on 6/28, the Israeli security cabinet approved the agreement the next day, with only 3 ministers voting against (DM Lieberman, Education Minister Bennett, and Justice Minister Shaked). On 7/1, the Lady Leyla set sail with 11,000 tons of humanitarian aid for Gaza; it berthed in Ashdod on 7/3, and its contents were shipped overland to Gaza over the next 2 days.
Meanwhile, Hamas’s leadership presented a united front in favor of the deal, releasing a statement on 6/27 expressing gratitude to the Turkish govt. for its efforts to ease the blockade on Gaza. But there were reports of mixed reactions on the part of Hamas. Some cited officials criticizing Turkey for “normalizing” the blockade on Gaza; others denied the Turkish allegation that Hamas’s leadership approved the agreement in advance.
Before its parliament could ratify the deal, however, Turkey witnessed an attempted coup on 7/15. In Istanbul, soldiers occupied Taksim Square, jets flew low over key bridges, and approximately 200 people were killed in the fighting. Eventually, forces loyal to the govt. prevailed. Erdoğan announced that he was back in full control early on 7/16, and proceeded with a widespread crackdown against opponents. Both Hamas and the Israeli govt. expressed support for the Turkish govt. in the wake of the coup, and senior Turkish and Israeli officials pledged (7/17) that the attempted coup would not hinder their reconciliation.
By the end of the quarter, the process, though delayed, remained firmly on track. On 8/12, Çavuşoğlu said that the Turkish parliament would ratify the deal before going on recess in mid-8/2016 and the Israeli govt. was reportedly waiting for the ratification to appoint a new amb. to Turkey (Jerusalem Post, 8/3).
As Israel and Turkey implemented the reconciliation deal they announced on 6/27 (see JPS 46 [1]), their new relationship took shape. Hours after Turkey’s parliament ratified (8/20) the 6/27 deal, the IDF launched a series of air strikes against Gaza targets allegedly belonging to Hamas, a long-time Turkish ally. With Ankara keen to improve relations with Israel to secure future energy partnerships while maintaining a positive relationship with Hamas, Turkey’s response to the assault was critical in that it set a precedent. Further raising the stakes was a protest against the IDF strikes by 5 Turks who attempted to break into the Israeli consulate in Istanbul on 8/21. The following day, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry released (8/22) a statement condemning the “disproportionate” strikes and stating that “the fact that our ties with Israel have normalized does not mean that we will remain silent in the face of such attacks that target the Palestinian people.”
Neither Israel nor Turkey allowed their differences over Hamas to get in the way of their reconciliation deal, however. Turkish pres. Erdoğan authorized the deal on 8/31, and Israel transferred (9/30) the agreed $20 m. to a humanitarian fund set up by the Turkish govt. for the victims of the 5/2010 Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara, the flagship of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. Meanwhile, a 2d Turkish cargo ship arrived (9/6) in the Israeli port of Ashdod with humanitarian aid destined for Gaza (the 1st arrived late the previous quarter; see JPS 46 [1]).
Turkish and Israeli energy ministers met in Istanbul on 10/13 for talks on strengthening energy cooperation, including the potential construction of a natural gas pipeline in the e. Mediterranean. In addition to advancing joint projects, this marked the 1st official and public ministerial meeting between Israelis and Turks since 5/2010. The 2 sides sealed the deal at the end of the quarter with an exchange of ambs. Israel sent (11/15) dep. amb. to Britain Eitan Na’eh to Ankara and Erdoğan appointed (11/16) 1 of his top foreign policy advisors, Kemal Ökem, amb. to Israel.
The Israeli and Turkish govts. continued building on their 6/27/2016 reconciliation agreement this quarter. On 12/9, a Turkish court dropped a 3-year-old criminal case against 4 IDF officers in connection with the Israeli assault on activists aboard the Mavi Marmara in 5/2010 (see JPS 40 [1]). The court’s ruling stemmed from a key provision of the 6/27/2016 deal, in which Turkey pledged to drop all legal claims related to the 5/2010 incident. Later in the quarter, the Turkish army’s chief of staff, Hulusi Akar, met (1/17) with IDF dep. chief of staff Yair Golan on the sidelines of a NATO meeting in Brussels, marking the 1st high-level contact between Israeli and Turkish military officials since 2010. On 1/31, an Israeli delegation flew to Ankara for the 1st strategic dialogue between Turks and Israelis in 6 years. (The 2 sides began their strategic dialogue in 1987 and had held 15 rounds of talks before relations broke down in 2010.) Turkey and Israel agreed to strengthen bilateral relations via business, academic, and cultural delegations.
The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, which was sealed with the 2 countries’ 6/27/2016 agreement to normalize relations (see JPS 46 [1]), suffered a setback this quarter because of the 9/25 Kurdish independence referendum. After 92% of Kurds voted in favor of independence, photos of Israeli flags being waved at events celebrating the vote proliferated in the media. Turkish pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who called the referendum a “threat to national security” for its potential to embolden the Kurds in Turkey, threatened to suspend (9/26) relations with Israel if Netanyahu did not abandon his support for an independent Kurdish state. He also alleged (9/30) that the presence of the Israeli flags showed “one thing, that [the Kurdish leadership] has a history with Mossad, they are hand-in-hand together.” Netanyahu denied (10/1) the accusation: “Israel played no part in the Turkish referendum, aside from the natural, deep and long-standing sympathy the Jewish people have for the Kurdish people and their aspirations.” Erdoğan repeated the claim a few times, but took no further action against Israel this quarter, opting instead to work with Iran and the Iraqi govt. to confront Kurdish separatists directly.
The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, which was sealed with the 2 countries’ 6/27/2016 agreement to normalize relations (see JPS 46 [1]), suffered a setback this quarter because of the 9/25 Kurdish independence referendum. After 92% of Kurds voted in favor of independence, photos of Israeli flags being waved at events celebrating the vote proliferated in the media. Turkish pres.