U.S. pres. Donald Trump, mired in domestic policy issues, sought a foreign policy achievement during this quarter. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians positioned themselves for yet another major U.S.-backed effort to advance the peace process. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu established an understanding on limiting settlement growth to appease Trump without antagonizing his ultranationalist political rivals, while the Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership struggled to consolidate power.
Netanyahu and his right-wing govt. continued their campaign against the Palestinian minority in Israel and other opponents, including supporters of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The Palestinians continued their efforts to obtain justice via international institutions. In addition to Palestinian Authority (PA) campaigns at various UN bodies (see “United Nations” below), Palestinian Football Association (PFA) chair Jibril Rajoub endeavored to have Israel censured by FIFA. Although a final decision on his proposal was ultimately delayed, Rajoub’s efforts galvanized the Palestinian public.
THE TRUMP INITIATIVE
In the early weeks of Trump’s presidency, the new U.S. admin. struggled to articulate a clear and unified position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beyond a general desire for peace and friendlier relations with Israel. Trump’s position on the 2-state solution, the consistent policy goal of his most recent predecessors, was not clear. Various stakeholders in the conflict sought to fill the void in the post-Obama era, advancing new ideas or, in Israel’s case, approving more than 5,000 new settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). (See JPS 46 [3]). Following Trump’s 2/15 meeting with Netanyahu in Washington, the new admin. lurched into action on a new peace initiative, clarifying its positions along the way.
As the quarter opened, the international community was concerned by Trump’s 2/15 debonair comments on the 2-state solution: “I am looking at 2 states or 1 state, and I like the one that both parties like,” he said in a joint press conference with Netanyahu after their meeting. U.S. support for a 2-state solution has been a cornerstone of international peace efforts since the Oslo Accords; Trump’s ambivalence presented a challenge to the post-Oslo diplomatic infrastructure. Many world leaders found the new U.S. stance “confusing and worrying.” French FM Ayrault said as much after a meeting with U.S. secy. of state Rex Tillerson on 2/16. In an effort to downplay confusion, U.S. amb. to the UN Nikki Haley said (2/16) that while the Trump admin. supported a 2-state solution, “We are thinking outside the box as well.” A week later, Trump himself stated (2/23) that he “like[d] this 2-state solution,” but uncertainty persisted as he added, “I’m satisfied with whatever both parties agree with.”
While world leaders grappled with the new U.S. approach, it became clear that Trump did have a preference on 1 substantial issue relating to the conflict. He told Netanyahu on 2/15 that he would like to see him “hold back on settlement for a little bit.” U.S. VP Mike Pence reportedly discussed a mechanism for limiting settlement growth with Netanyahu on 2/16. Under pressure from ultranationalist mbrs. of his coalition to build more settlements, abandon the 2-state solution, and/or annex parts of the West Bank, Netanyahu boasted of his “excellent” meeting with Trump upon returning to Israel on 2/16 and told (2/19) the security cabinet that the Trump admin. shared their views on regional threats to Israel. However, he also reportedly said (2/19) that they might have to find a new housing solution for the 40-odd families evacuated from the illegal Amona settlement outpost in early 2/2017 (see JPS 46 [3]). Officials in the PM’s office later denied (2/20) that he was planning on breaking his promise to build a new settlement for the Amona evacuees while Netanyahu himself attempted (2/19) to draw attention away from the issue, saying “with all due respect to Amona, we need to focus now on coordinating with Trump on the issue of Iran.” DM Avigdor Lieberman reinforced (2/20) the PM’s precarious new position: “For 8 years, there was tension and friction with the Obama admin. If we now start to fight with the Trump admin. . . . and the Republican-majority Congress, people will really start to think that the leadership in the State of Israel is a bunch of nutcases.”
Israel’s ultranationalists, however, had plans of their own. Education Min. Naftali Bennett expressed certainty (2/20) that Netanyahu would “keep his word” and approve a new settlement for the former residents of Amona as mbrs. of his Jewish Home Party began mapping out legislation to force the PM’s hand. Pushback also came from inside Netanyahu’s own party. During a reportedly heated debate on 2/27, a group of Likud members of the Knesset (MKs) vigorously argued for Israel to annex at least part of the West Bank. According to unnamed participants in the meeting, Netanyahu acknowledged that Trump’s election represented a “historic” opportunity for Israel, but added, “We should know what the limits of this opportunity are.”
A few days later, the Israeli press reported (3/1) that Likud and Jewish Home MKs were working together to test those limits. Likud MK Yoav Kisch and Jewish Home MK Bezalel Smotrich reportedly drafted a bill annexing the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc intended to go to the Ministerial Comm. for Legislation on 3/5. Amid a flurry of backroom horse trading, Netanyahu postponed (3/3) the Comm.’s hearing on the proposal by 1 week. “Imposing Israeli sovereignty [on the West Bank] would mean an immediate crisis with the [Trump] admin.,” Lieberman told (3/6) the Knesset’s Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Defense.
While the Israelis debated the limits of their settlement enterprise, the Trump admin. began laying the groundwork for resuming some kind of peace effort. At a meeting of the Republican Jewish Coalition in Las Vegas (2/24), Pence said that, while Trump was expecting Israel to make some compromises as part of any final agreement, he would not expect the Israeli leadership to compromise on Israel’s security. He also said that Trump was still “assessing” his campaign pledge to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (the Israeli govt. was officially in favor of the move, despite warnings from its security establishment that it would instigate a wave of violence in the oPt (see “The Ownership of the U.S. Embassy Site in Jerusalem” in JPS 29 [4] for more on this issue). A congressional delegation led by Rep. Ron DeSantis (R-FL) visited (3/4) Israel the following week to explore the feasibility of the embassy move. DeSantis said (3/5) that he thought the move would happen. “Knowing the president,” he said, “I don’t think that he’s going to [delay it].”
Meanwhile, the Trump admin. was also reviewing the U.S. relationship with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Dep. Asst. Secy. of State Erin Barclay said (3/1) that Trump hoped to end the UNHRC’s “obsession with Israel” and that“in order for this council to have any credibility, let alone success, it must move away from its unbalanced and unproductive positions,” bringing the admin.’s position on the UNHRC in line with Netanyahu’s (the U.S. later boycotted the UNHRC’s discussion of Israel on 3/20 and pledged to oppose all res. deriving therefrom; see “United Nations” below). Around the same time, Haley met (3/7) with Palestinian UN envoy Riyad Mansour, and called on the Palestinians to “meet with Israel in direct negotiations rather than looking to the UN to deliver results.”
The U.S. admin. put the wheels in motion in mid-3/2017, starting with Trump’s 1st official contact with PA pres. Mahmoud Abbas. In a call on 3/10, Trump invited the Palestinian leader to come to the White House soon to “relaunch the peace process,” according to a PA spokesperson. Although it was unclear what he was hoping to achieve, White House sources said (3/10) that Trump would be willing to participate in a regional peace conference in Egypt or Jordan, giving credence to unconfirmed reports from last quarter that he favored an “outside-in” approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace (see JPS 46 [3]). A couple of days after the call, Abbas said that Trump “promised his full commitment to peace and to the 2-state solution.” The PA pres. and his advisors were reportedly pleased with the call and how Trump spoke about the new peace effort.
Next, Trump’s special rep. for international negotiations, Jason Greenblatt, visited Israel and the oPt in the 2d week of 3/2017. The visit, touted as a listening tour rather than shuttle diplomacy, coincided with a key Knesset vote on the ultranationalists’ Ma’ale Adumim proposal, and produced immediate results. Shortly after Greenblatt met (3/14) with Netanyahu for 5 hours in Jerusalem, the head of Israel’s ruling coalition, David Bitan, requested that the Ministerial Comm. for Legislation again delay its vote on the annexation bill. Bennett agreed, reportedly in an effort not to interfere with Greenblatt’s trip. According to a joint statement, Netanyahu and Greenblatt discussed the broader settlement issue “in the hope of working out an approach that is consistent with the goal of advancing peace and security.” Before his 2d meeting with Greenblatt later that week, Netanyahu said (3/16), “We are in the midst of a process of dialogue with the White House and our intention is to reach an agreed-upon policy regarding settlement construction.” An Israeli official said (3/15) that Netanyahu believed that it was possible to reach such an understanding without compromising his ruling coalition. “We are looking for the common denominator with the Americans that will allow construction on the one hand, and on the other promote diplomatic moves in many areas with the Trump administration,” the official added.
Although the admin.’s focus was clearly on Israel and the settlements, Greenblatt also met (3/14) with Abbas in Ramallah and reaffirmed Trump’s commitment to achieving peace. Abbas appeared optimistic about the process, stating that “under Pres. Trump’s leadership, a historic peace deal is possible,” and reportedly committing to preventing “inflammatory rhetoric” and “anti-Israeli incitement” in the context of a push for renewed talks.
Trump’s team wasted no time, hosting an Israeli delegation for 4 more days of talks (3/19–23) the following week to discuss “concrete, near-term measures to improve the overall climate to advance the prospects for a genuine and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians,” according to a 3/23 joint statement. The measures included steps Israel could take to improve the economic situation in the oPt, as well as delivering needed humanitarian relief to Gaza. The Israeli govt. agreed to take the Trump admin.’s concerns about settlement activity “into consideration.” There was no broader agreement to limit settlement growth, however, and Netanyahu denied (3/26) all rumors to the contrary. But, on 3/30, he told his security cabinet that Israel would, in fact, be adopting new regulations on settlement growth: Construction would continue in previously developed areas, when permissible, and adjacent areas, when not permissible; construction would be allowed on the closest land possible to developed areas when neither adjacent nor permissible land was available; and new settlement outposts would be barred outright.
One minister present at the meeting insisted that there were “no understandings with the [U.S.] and this wasn’t agreed on with the [Trump admin.], but rather, these are restrictions that Israel is taking upon itself in response to the pres.’s request.” Another minister commented that “the Americans said that they don’t agree with construction in the settlements in any case, but that they can live with it and there won’t be an international crisis over every new home that’s built.” Israel’s new settlement policy reportedly stemmed from Netanyahu’s desire that Israel not be blamed in the event that the Trump peace initiative failed. To that end, he told the cabinet that he intended to acquiesce to the Trump admin.’s requests for goodwill gestures to help the Palestinian economy (see “Occupation Data and Trends” below).
At the same security cabinet meeting, however, Israeli leaders unanimously approved the creation of a new Israeli settlement n. of Ramallah to house the former residents of Amona. Netanyahu also announced (3/30) that 900 dunams (approx. 222 acres from the Nablus-area villages of al-Sawiya, al-Lubban al-Sharqiyya and Qaryut) nr. the Eli settlement had been declared state land, and that final approval had been given to market 2,000 new homes in existing settlements (these 2,000 were among the 5,700 advanced in the 3 weeks following Trump’s inauguration on 1/20; see JPS 46 [3]). While the rest of the international community condemned these moves, a senior U.S. official said (3/30) that Trump accepted Netanyahu’s rationale for approving the new settlement, and a White House spokesperson said (3/31) that the Trump admin. welcomed the Israeli govt.’s intention to adopt a settlement policy that took Trump’s concerns into consideration. Meanwhile, the response of Netanyahu’s ultranationalist rivals was mixed. Although Bennett said (4/2) that “the arrangement is a fitting one,” he was also critical of Netanyahu’s failure to “put a decisive Israeli initiative on the table.” Oded Revivi, the chief foreign envoy for the Yesha Council, a settler umbrella group, said (4/2) that “you need to understand that people built up an expectation that there would be a new president, the old era would end, and we’d be able to do whatever we want. All of a sudden, reality doesn’t look like our expectations.”
After the Israeli govt. and the Trump admin. arrived at this new understanding, however, unofficial, diplomatic attention shifted to the Palestinians, who were busy coordinating a response to Trump’s initiative with their regional allies. Abbas met with Egyptian pres. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on 3/20 in Cairo to discuss Trump’s efforts, inter alia. He then addressed the 28th Arab League Summit in Jordan on 3/29, calling for the Arab Peace Initiative to be implemented “as it was first approved” (see Doc. B1 in JPS 31 [4]). As Abbas met with Jordan’s King Abdullah and al-Sisi again on the sidelines of the summit, rumors circulated that the Palestinians were preparing to present a new peace plan of their own.
After both al-Sisi (4/3) and Abdullah (4/5) flew to Washington for one-on-one meetings with Trump, the Palestinians began laying out their new position. “There will be no return to the negotiations table until there is a complete settlement freeze in the Palestinian territories that were occupied in 1967,” said senior PA official Nabil Shaath on 4/6. Abbas, meanwhile, stopped mentioning any of the recent Palestinian conditions for a possible resumption of direct peace talks (e.g., the release of the prisoners who were supposed to be set free in connection with the last round of peace talks in 3–4/2014; see JPS 43 [3, 4]). The Israelis quickly embraced the apparent change. “It has always been our position to engage in direct negotiations anytime, anywhere, with no preconditions,” Netanyahu’s spokesperson said (4/20). “For years, Abbas has avoided negotiations, and we would welcome a change in his position.”
After meeting again with al-Sisi (4/29) and Abdullah (4/30), Abbas flew to Washington for his 1st face-to-face meeting with Trump. A PA spokesperson said (5/1) that Abbas intended to highlight the need for a “just and comprehensive peace based on the 2-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative,” but speculation grew that he was planning a larger gesture. At the White House, Trump and Abbas jointly committed (5/3) to a new peace effort, and Trump said he was ready to do “whatever is necessary” to achieve peace. The public statements remained vague and it was unclear which specific issues were under discussion. However, a source in Abbas’s office later said (5/9) that the Palestinians put forward an ambitious proposal. The PA pres. reportedly urged Trump to resume peace talks on the basis of the proposal former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert had made to Abbas in 2008 (see JPS 37 [2]). Abbas’s staff reportedly showed Trump documents and maps from the 2008 talks, and explained that the Olmert plan had called for withdrawal from all but 6.3% of the West Bank in order to maintain control of certain settlement blocs and to compensate the Palestinians with an equivalent 5.8% of the West Bank in Israeli territory. “If we achieve accords on the borders, we can bridge all the other gaps,” the PA official said. “But if the conversation starts at Netanyahu’s opening position, that he isn’t prepared to say what Israel’s borders are, we won’t get anywhere.” (The Palestinians did not respond to the Olmert proposal in 2008, citing the then PM’s ongoing legal troubles; see JPS 37 [3].)
Both the Trump admin. and the Palestinians were optimistic in the aftermath of the meeting, except for 1 lingering issue: the PA’s payments to Palestinian prisoners convicted of serious crimes against Israelis and their families. In the lead-up to the meeting, Israel’s leaders repeatedly brought up the issue as a potential sticking point in any negotiations. Lieberman named the Palestinian National Fund, primarily used to process the prisoners’ payments, a terrorist organization on 3/16, and Netanyahu called on Abbas to cancel the payments on 5/1. “How can you talk about peace and fund terrorism?” he said. Trump reportedly raised the issue with Abbas on 5/3, prompting Shaath to respond in public on 5/4. “The demand that Ramallah stop payments to the families of security prisoners is mad,” he said. “Such a requirement is designed to destroy any chance for a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.” Still, Shaath noted (5/8) that Trump was “very warm, very respectful” and he “gave equal treatment to our president as he’s given to other heads of state he’s met.”
The White House wasted no time in plotting the next step, announcing (5/4) plans for Trump to visit Israel and the oPt on 5/22–23. Through the rest of the quarter, both the Palestinians and Israelis jockeyed for position on various issues related to the peace process, including the PA’s payments to prisoners, Trump’s campaign promise to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, and settlements, but both sides appeared ready to follow Trump’s lead.
PAST PEACE EFFORTS COME TO LIGHT
Four days after Netanyahu stood (2/15) alongside Trump in Washington to discuss a new “regional approach,” Haaretz published (2/19) a major report detailing former pres. Barack Obama’s failure to push Netanyahu into a new round of peace talks in early 2016. Since the Obama admin. had pursued a regional framework much like the one Trump seemed to favor, the report offered a rough outline of the obstacles the new U.S. pres. could expect to face.
According to former senior U.S. officials, then secy. of state John Kerry presented a regional peace plan to Netanyahu, al-Sisi, and Abdullah at a summit on 2/21/2016. (The 6 principles Kerry later outlined on 12/28/2016 reportedly comprised the backbone of the plan; see JPS 46 [3].) Netanyahu rejected the proposal, arguing that he would not be able to get his right-wing coalition behind it. However, 2 weeks later, Netanyahu opened negotiations with Israeli opposition leader Isaac Herzog on the basis of Kerry’s plan, with the idea of forming a new centrist coalition that could give him enough support to stay in power. According to former U.S. officials, it was this proposal that Herzog referenced when he said, on 5/15/2016, that a rare diplomatic opportunity was at hand (see JPS 46 [1]). The Netanyahu-Herzog negotiations broke down, however, and Netanyahu invited Lieberman and his Yisrael Beytenu party into the coalition in 5/2016.
Hours after the Haaretz report appeared, Netanyahu confirmed (2/19) that he had attended the 2/21 meeting. He also claimed to have initiated the regional effort. A senior Israeli diplomatic official then blamed (2/21) Obama for scuttling the initiative by trying to “dictate terms.” For his part, Herzog said (2/20) that he had “demanded” a full settlement freeze at the 3/2016 negotiations on his potential entry to the ruling coalition. In an effort to set himself apart from Netanyahu, he also published (2/23) an op-ed in Haaretz laying out his 10-point plan for peace in the Middle East and with the Palestinians, including a 10-year implementation period and the construction of a port off Gaza’s coast.
With the Israeli political establishment in turmoil over the report, Haaretz published (3/5) another story outlining the backroom dealings behind the subsequent 6 mos. of negotiations between the 2 sides. Citing an Israeli source and a former senior U.S. diplomat, Haaretz reported that Netanyahu and Herzog had negotiated a series of understandings in early 9/2016 as the basis for a regional peace initiative and an Israeli unity govt., including a pledge to “implement” settlement “activities” in the oPt “in a manner that would facilitate a regional dialogue for peace.” They reportedly planned to present the compromise at a regional summit in Cairo or Sharm al-Shaykh in early 10/2016 before returning to Israel to complete talks on bringing Herzog’s Zionist Union into the ruling coalition. Kerry, meanwhile, had secured the support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, which pledged to normalize relations with Israel if they saw Israeli-Palestinian peace talks making sufficient progress. The process had broken down after former Israeli pres. Shimon Peres’s death on 9/28. Netanyahu was under increased pressure from the ultranationalist elements of his coalition, particularly concerning the illegal Amona settlement outpost (see JPS 46 [2]), and he stopped negotiating the details with Herzog. “Netanyahu began to gradually withdraw,” according to a Zionist Union source close to the talks. “Little by little, he tried to back down from what had already been agreed on and tried to postpone it all because of Amona and pressure by [the Jewish Home Party].”
Netanyahu’s office denied (3/5) the contents of the report. “The description concerning the possible regional process that wasn’t realized is false from the ground up. The matter has nothing to do with Amona. PM Netanyahu is interested in advancing a regional initiative. Whoever is giving you this information isn’t knowledgeable of the details, or is falsifying them.” The Israeli PM told (3/5) his cabinet that the leak likely stemmed from disagreements within Herzog’s Labor Party, the Zionist Union’s senior partner that was gearing up for a leadership contest in 7/2017.
SETTLEMENT GROWTH IN THE TRUMP ERA
Before and after Netanyahu announced (3/30) his new regulations for settlement growth (see above), Israel’s ultranationalists advanced numerous plans and initiatives to strengthen the overall settlement enterprise. While wary of drawing the new U.S. pres.’s ire, none of their subsequent announcements provoked much of a response from Trump or his admin.
Israel’s Knesset passed (2/20) a new law allowing the govt. to require private businesses that choose not to sell products or services to Israel’s settlements in the oPt to display signage indicating that choice on their premises. Businesses that failed to comply were liable to fines. MK Shuli Moalem-Refaeli (Jewish Home), who proposed the legislation, said (2/20) that “if [businesses] fear being put on customers’ blacklists, they should treat them all equally.”
Following last quarter’s passage of the so-called Regulations Bill, which retroactively legalized settlement outposts in the West Bank (see JPS 46 [3]), the Knesset informed the High Court of Justice (3/26) that it had accepted Atty. Gen. Avichai Mandelblit’s 3/12 proposal to suspend Palestinian land expropriation under the bill until the Israeli govt. could map the extent of its impact. It was unclear how long the mapping effort would last. In a related development, the Israeli nongovernmental organization (NGO) Peace Now reported (4/22) that, despite Netanyahu’s 3/30 pledge to bar new settlement outposts, construction on a new outpost e. of Ramallah had just begun. The founding residents said (4/22) that high housing costs in Jerusalem forced them to seek land in the West Bank. “Regardless of the outpost residents’ reasoning, the political implications of the outpost are the same,” Peace Now responded in its report. “What distinguishes this outpost from others is the settler leadership’s cynical exploitation of the economic situation of the new residents of the outpost, by granting them free land and enabling them to construct homes illegally, as long as it contributes to the settler goals of destroying the possibility of ever creating a Palestinian state.” Israeli forces ordered (4/22) construction on the outpost to stop soon after Peace Now’s report was released.
Meanwhile, Israel’s Ministry of Housing and Construction revived plans for the construction of 10,000 housing units in a Jewish settlement at the site of the abandoned Atarot Airport nr. Qalandia, according to a 4/24 report on Israel’s Channel 10. The plans had been shelved because of pressure from former U.S. pres. Obama, and reportedly revived soon after Trump’s inauguration in 1/2017. Likewise, Israeli construction minister Yoav Galant said (4/28) that plans to build 25,000 new homes in Jerusalem, including 15,000 outside the pre-1967 armistice lines, were back on the table now that Trump was in power. Some Israeli officials surmised that a formal construction announcement might coincide with Trump’s visit to the region on 5/22–23. Finally, the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, which administers settlements in a region n. of Jerusalem, began soliciting bids to build more than 200 new apartments in the Tel Zion settlement (Haaretz, 5/15). These new dwellings were reportedly approved as part of a broader plan dating back to the 1980s.
PERSECUTING THE PALESTINIAN MINORITY AND OTHER OPPONENTS
For years, the right-wing Israeli govt. has been consolidating power at the expense of its left-wing rivals and the Palestinian minority in Israel. This quarter proved no exception to that trend, as Netanyahu and his allies advanced legislation and other measures to further marginalize, undermine, and persecute the Palestinian minority, the Israeli Left, and the BDS movement.
Legislative Targeting and a Judicial Shake-Up
On 2/22, the Knesset’s Judicial Appointments Comm. appointed 4 new justices to the Supreme Court. The move was widely seen as a victory for Justice Min. Ayelet Shaked’s (Jewish Home) years-long campaign to shift the composition of the court to the right. Three of the 4 new justices—David Mintz, Yosef Elron, and Yael Willner—were on Shaked’s short list of candidates. George Karra, a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a Tel Aviv District Court judge, was considered a compromise. Because the court is widely considered one of Israel’s last left-leaning centers of power, Haaretz’s editor in chief Aluf Benn called (2/23) the appointments “the most important achievement in the political and social revolution being pursued by Benjamin Netanyahu’s current government . . . one that will impact court rulings and Israeli democracy for many years to come.”
In the legislative domain, the Knesset passed (3/8) a preliminary reading of the so-called muezzin bill, which the Ministerial Comm. for Legislation approved last quarter (see JPS 46 [3]). The bill, barring mosques from broadcasting the call to prayer during certain hours or in certain situations, had already stirred up controversy and drawn accusations of religious persecution, as well as a backlash from the international community. In a heated debate leading up to the 3/8 vote, Joint List chair Ayman Odeh ripped up a draft of the bill in protest and was ejected from the chamber. After it passed, a Jordanian govt. spokesperson said (3/8) that it might violate international human rights law and Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan. Following its preliminary reading, the muezzin bill was transferred to the House Comm., where MKs were set to deliberate and send a consensus draft to the full plenum for a 1st reading.
The following week, the Knesset approved (3/14) amendments to Israel’s Basic Laws that would bar politicians who use “inciting rhetoric” from running for office, including “cases where they aim or operate, explicitly or implicitly, to deny the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, make racist or inciting comments, or support terrorism or an armed struggle against the State of Israel.” MK Osama Saadi (Joint List) said (3/14) that the backers of the amendments were letting it be known that they desired an “Arab-free Knesset.” Later, on 4/5, the Knesset passed “yet another law that expresses the continued policy of the Netanyahu govt. of discrimination against Israel’s Arab citizens,” according to MK Abdullah Abu Maaruf (Joint List). This law imposed maximum sentences on those convicted of illegal construction, and ceded some of the courts’ authority over such offences to the Ministry of Finance. Because construction planning and licensing in Palestinian communities inside Israel is notoriously difficult or impossible to obtain, the bill would disproportionately affect the Palestinian minority.
The most significant development in the Israeli Right’s campaign against the Palestinian minority this quarter was the resuscitation of the so-called nation-state bill. Disagreements over competing drafts of an earlier version of this bill brought down the previous Israeli govt. in late 2014 and early 2015, so its revival was momentous for Netanyahu and his allies. The draft, which the Ministerial Comm. for Legislation approved on 5/7 and the Knesset approved in a preliminary reading on 5/10, would cancel the status of Arabic as an “official language” and codify Israel’s status as the “national home of the Jewish people.” This new draft did not include the most controversial provision of previous versions, which would have subordinated Israel’s democracy to its Jewish character. Zehava Galon, a leader of the left-wing Meretz Party, said (5/7) that the bill was “a declaration of war against Israel’s Arab citizens and against Israel as a democratic and properly governed society.” After the bill passed the preliminary vote, Shaked announced (5/10) that the govt. would be drafting its own version, perhaps including the democracy provision, and presenting it within 60 days.
In addition to ongoing efforts to marginalize the Palestinian minority, Netanyahu and his allies also targeted left-wing Israeli groups this quarter. On 2/27, the Ministerial Comm. for Legislation approved a bill that would revoke tax benefits for donors to NGOs “acting against Israel” in the international arena. Proposed by Jewish Home MK Smotrich, the bill would specifically affect any “public institution that releases statements accusing the State of Israel of committing war crimes” and any “institution that takes part in calls for a boycott of the State of Israel.” Mordechai Kremnitzer and Amir Fuchs, researchers at the Israel Democracy Institute, said (2/27) that because “the question [of] who harms the state and what harms it is up for public debate,” and because it would disproportionately affect left-leaning groups, the bill would tarnish Israel’s image abroad and undermine its legitimacy in international forums.
A couple of mos. later, Netanyahu provided an example of how this bill would work. A few hours after German FM Sigmar Gabriel arrived in Israel for a state visit on 4/24, Netanyahu threatened not to meet with him unless he canceled his plans to also meet with reps. of the left-wing NGOs B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence on 4/25. Gabriel stood his ground, saying (4/25) that it would be “regrettable” if Netanyahu decided to cancel their meeting due to his “totally normal” contacts with the 2 NGOs, and Netanyahu made the cancellation official. Although Gabriel said that it would likely not affect German ties with Israel, Haaretz reported (4/26) that tensions were high in the wake of the visit and that Germany was reticent to help Israel combat an allegedly anti-Israeli res. percolating through UNESCO as a result (see “United Nations” below).
The Ghattas Investigation
Last quarter, the Knesset Home Comm. lifted (12/21) MK Basel Ghattas’s (Joint List) parliamentary immunity, clearing the way for him to be tried on charges that he allegedly smuggled 12 mobile phones to incarcerated Palestinians at Ketziot Prison on 12/8 (see JPS 46 [3]). Seventy-one MKs signed a petition calling for Ghattas’s removal from the Knesset in 2/2017, initiating a debate on the proposal in the Home Comm. on 3/14. Before the debate could conclude, Ghattas accepted (3/16) a plea deal that would see him resign his seat, pay a NIS 120,000 (approx. $33) fine, and spend 2 years in prison. The Beersheba Magistrate’s Court accepted Ghattas’s plea on 4/9, and the former MK was set to begin serving his prison sentence on 7/2.
Meanwhile, Joumah Azbarga, a fellow Balad Party mbr., was sworn in (3/21) to replace Ghattas as a representative of the Joint List on 3/21. Azbarga, a resident of the Bedouin village of Lakia, said (3/21) he intended “to fight for recognition of [Bedouin villages] in the Negev” and to “deal with poverty issues among Negev residents.”
Countering BDS
In an effort to counter the growing strength of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, the Knesset passed a new law denying entry visas and residency rights to foreign nationals calling for economic, cultural, or academic boycotts of Israel or “areas under its control,” such as Israel’s settlements in the oPt. (The interior minister could make exceptions on a case-by-case basis.) Israel was already known for turning away individual travelers for political reasons, but this new law formalized the practice and ushered in a wave of high-profile denials, including the chair of the UK-based Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Hugh Lanning (3/12); British-Palestinian prof. Kamel Hawwash (4/7); and the executive dir. of the Palestinian Federation of Chile, Anuar Majluf (4/10). As each of these denials gave rise to controversy, the law had a galvanizing effect on the BDS movement. More than 100 U.S. Jewish studies scholars signed a petition protesting the bill in 3/2017, saying, “It will be bad for Israel, bad for the cause of democracy at this fragile moment, and bad for the principles of free speech and thought on which our scholarship is based.” Likewise, the U.S. NGO Americans for Peace Now sent a letter to potential participants in an upcoming study tour of Israel informing them that the trip was canceled in light of the new law. “We do not know yet whether we will reschedule this tour to another date this year or whether we’ll have to suspend our Israel Study Tour program indefinitely,” the letter read. “The law is a stain on Israeli democracy. It betrays the democratic principles upon which Israel was established.”
While the Israeli govt. was targeting BDS at a legislative level, the Israeli police continued to harass BDS cofounder Omar Barghouti, a resident of Acre. They detained him on charges related to tax evasion on 3/20, and interrogated him and his family over the course of the following week. Barghouti was allowed access to e-mail on 4/1, and sent a statement to his supporters: “Due to a gag order,” he wrote, “I am not allowed to delve into any facts about the case. I am thus denied the ability to even refute the vicious lies published by Israel’s regime against me. I am in no hurry to do so, though, as their main objective—attempting to tarnish my reputation and, by extension, hurting the BDS movement—has clearly failed.”
In a related development, Haaretz reported (3/21) that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Gilad Erdan, the official responsible for the govt.’s anti-BDS efforts, had been working for mos. on a proposal to build a database of Israeli citizens who promote and support BDS. The database would complement Erdan’s efforts to collect similar information on foreign activists. Mandelblit, however, was reportedly opposed to the proposal, even though Erdan insisted that the information would be culled primarily from public sources. Ronnie Barkan, cofounder of the Israeli NGO Boycott from Within, welcomed the news on 3/22: “It is a good sign that we’re on the right track.”
RESTRICTIONS ON PALESTINIAN SOCCER
In the spring of 2015, PFA chair Rajoub started a campaign to compel international soccer’s governing body, FIFA, to bar Israel from international competition. He argued that the Israeli authorities were restricting the movement of Palestinian players and coaches, obstructing the construction of Palestinian sports facilities, and violating Article 72.2 of FIFA’s statutes, which states that “member associations and their clubs may not play on the territory of another member association without the latter’s approval.” (Six teams in the Israel Football Association [IFA] are based in Israeli settlements in the West Bank.) Rajoub’s initial efforts resulted in the creation of a FIFA monitoring comm. on 5/29/2015 (see JPS 45 [1]). In the ensuing 2 years, he kept up the campaign, working against an increasingly energized Israeli opposition in the lead-up to the 2017 meeting of the FIFA Congress, which was set for 5/10–11 in Bahrain.
Two mos. before the congress, Tokyo Sexwale, the monitoring comm.’s chair, met (3/22) with Rajoub and the head of the IFA, Ofer Eini, at FIFA’s headquarters in Zurich. He presented them a draft report he had prepared for the congress, including 3 recommendations for resolving the dispute: maintaining the status quo “with the legal risks arising therefrom”; allowing the IFA 6 mos. “to rectify the situation of the 6 clubs in question”; or requesting further negotiations. Eini was reportedly furious with Sexwale for suggesting that FIFA could suspend Israel if it did not disband the 6 settlement teams, leading to a “stormy, even virulent” meeting, according to a source close to the talks (Agence France-Presse, 3/24). None of the 3 recommendations passed muster with Rajoub. “I respect and appreciate what [FIFA] did,” he said, at a press conference in al-Ram on 4/3, “[but I would] prefer that we go right away to sanction and to suspension.”
After the meeting, Rajoub enjoyed a groundswell of support. More than 100 sports associations, trade unions, human rights groups, and faith groups from 28 countries signed onto (4/28) a letter to the FIFA Council calling on it to suspend Israel if the IFA neglected to revoke the affiliation of the 6 settler clubs. Then, 174 Palestinian soccer teams threw their weight behind the call in another letter to the council on 5/4.
At the same time, the Israeli govt. stepped up its efforts to squash Rajoub’s campaign. On 4/18, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a cable to dozens of its embassies around the world with instructions on how to lobby their hosts: “We urge you to contact your countries’ representatives on the FIFA Council as soon as possible to obtain their support for Israel’s position, which rejects mixing politics with sport and calls for reaching an agreed solution between the parties” (Haaretz, 4/20). Meanwhile, Eini’s response to Sexwale’s draft report apparently caused the FIFA official to reconsider. According to a senior Israeli official, Sexwale amended the report by removing any mention of the possibility that Israel could be suspended from international soccer.
In a last-ditch effort to prevent a vote on the matter, Netanyahu personally called FIFA pres. Giovanni “Gianni” Infantino on 5/5 to urge the removal of the Palestinian-backed motion from the congress’s agenda. He reportedly argued that Rajoub was only pushing so hard on the issue to make a name for himself ahead of Abbas’s increasingly imminent departure from politics. One official in Netanyahu’s office said (5/5) that the PM had also asked senior U.S. officials to push Abbas on the issue when he was in Washington on 5/3 (see above). Following on Netanyahu’s conversation with Infantino, the Israeli govt. reportedly sent its own proposed res. to FIFA (Haaretz, 5/9). According to an Israeli official, the proposed res. “wouldn’t change the status quo regarding soccer games in the settlements, but would provide a practical solution to the issue.” The official did not disclose any specifics, saying, “Israel wouldn’t consent to the settlement teams ceasing to play in the [IFA] or to any decision that made a diplomatic statement.”
FIFA’s joint monitoring comm. held one last meeting between the parties the day before the congress was set to begin, but it was inconclusive. In the end, FIFA relented to Israeli pressure. The FIFA Council decided (5/9) to remove the Palestinian-backed motion from the congress’s agenda, stating, “At this stage it is premature for the FIFA Congress to take any decision.” FIFA’s congress then gave (5/11) Sexwale and his comm. a 9-mo. extension to finalize their report and work on a negotiated resolution. “We have good and loyal friends in FIFA,” Eini said of the results. “I don’t have enough words to thank them for firmly standing by our side and . . . removing the Palestinian proposal from the agenda.”