Quarterly Updates for (16 Feb 2017 — 15 May 2017)

The foreign policy community in Washington, both in and out of govt., struggled with the persistent uncertainty surrounding the new U.S. pres.’s plans this quarter. Trump’s vision in the realm of international relations remained unclear, especially with regard to the IsraeliPalestinian arena. Trump delayed or rolled back several key campaign promises (e.g., moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and backing out of the JCPOA). Trump’s willingness to break his campaign promises and to overturn other long-standing principles of U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (such as the 2-state solution) posed new challenges to the traditional power structures underpinning the peace process and the bipartisan pro-Israel consensus in Washington.

Trump’s 12/15 nomination of David Friedman as U.S. ambassador to Israel, and his support for Israel’s settlement enterprise in particular, proved to be a partisan wedge issue. Friedman, who called the 2-state solution an “illusion” in an Arutz Sheva op-ed on 2/8/2016, reversed his stance in his hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on 2/16. He said a 2-state solution was the “most ideal” option and the “best possibility for peace in the region,” and that he would support a “peace deal that included Beit El [settlement],” despite his widely known fiscal and political support for that settlement (see JPS 46 [3]). Notwithstanding such pronouncements, Friedman’s connections to Israel’s settlement enterprise dogged his nomination. The comm.’s ranking Democrat, Ben Cardin (MD), reminded (2/16) the comm. of Friedman’s comments on anti-settlement groups in the U.S.—he once compared left-wing U.S. Jewish groups to “kapos,” referring to the Jews who had collaborated with the Nazis during the Holocaust. Later, U.S. sen. and former presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (I-VT) sent a letter to Friedman (3/1) asking for clarification on his support for a 2-state solution, his position on Israel’s settlements, and his views on U.S. aid to Israel. Amid the debate over Friedman’s ties to the settlements, Haaretz reported (3/7) that they were deeper than previously known. In addition to his leadership role in a group that raised money for Beit El, Friedman had reportedly made several donations to Ateret Cohanim, the farright messianic organization heavily involved in settlement activity to Judaize East Jerusalem. In the end, the Foreign Relations Comm. approved (3/9) Friedman’s nomination in a 12–9 vote, with only Robert Menendez (D-NJ) breaking party lines. The full senate followed suit on 3/23, with only Joe Manchin (D-WV) joining Menendez in voting with the Republicans.

The bipartisan consensus largely held on issues unrelated to Israel’s settlements; however, there were indications that PM Netanyahu’s personal conduct was threatening the fragile consensus. On 3/28, Haaretz reported that at least 5 senior officials at major U.S.-Jewish organizations had relayed their fears to the Israeli govt. that Netanyahu’s warm embrace of Trump was putting Democrats and left-leaning U.S.-Jewish groups in a difficult position. “Close cooperation between Israel and the Trump admin. on security and diplomatic issues is a good thing,” said one of the officials, “but when the PM seems like he is literally hugging Trump and tweets praise for his plan to build a wall on the border with Mexico, that goes beyond diplomatic relationships and becomes political.” Another official noted that the Israeli govt. might not be sympathetic to such fears, and that his Israeli interlocutors responded to his concerns with “a silent nod that expressed understanding, but not agreement.”

Meanwhile, Rep. DeSantis (R-FL) and Bill Johnson (R-OH) launched (4/27) the Congressional Israel Victory Caucus to promote pro-Israel policies in Congress but they failed to bring a single Democrat on as a mbr.

Within the Democratic party, Minnesota rep. Keith Ellison’s bid to lead the Democratic National Comm. presented a challenge to the party’s traditional support for Israel, drawing complaints from pro-Israel megadonors and a wave of enthusiasm from Palestinian solidarity activists last quarter (see JPS 46 [3]). Ellison ultimately lost (2/25) the race to former labor secy. Tom Perez. In his 1st official motion as chair, however, Perez appointed (2/25) Ellison dep. chair, signaling a willingness to work with a colleague deeply critical of Israel’s human rights record.

Aid to the Palestinians

In the final hours before Trump took office on 1/20, the Obama admin. released $221 m. in previously frozen aid to the PA. When the news broke on 1/24, the Trump admin. promptly refroze the aid. This quarter, however, they released the money, redirecting it to humanitarian organizations working in the oPt, according to a State Dept. spokesperson on 3/9.

Around the same time that the Trump admin. was deciding what to do with that $221 m., it was formulating its 1st federal budget proposal. On 3/15, it unveiled a document titled “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,” which outlined large cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency and the State Dept., and increases for the Dept. of Defense. The budget blueprint did not provide many details on funding for programs related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A mo. later, Foreign Policy reported (4/24) on a leaked 15-page State Dept. document that laid out the Trump admin.’s intentions on a more granular level. Beginning in fiscal year 2018, the admin. reportedly planned to overhaul U.S. foreign aid, cutting economic aid to Egypt by 47.7%, and to Jordan by 21%, and a simultaneous increase of 4.6% to the West Bank and Gaza, totaling approximately $215 m. per year.

Legislative Crackdown on BDS

Outside of Washington, the legislative campaign to stymie the growing Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement at the state and local levels made steady gains this quarter. New measures were introduced in 10 state legislatures this quarter barring public employee retirement funds from investing in companies that boycott Israel or barring states from contracting with such companies (AR, IL, KS, ME, MN, MT, NY, NC, OR, and TX). These measures passed into law in Texas (5/2) and Arkansas (3/29). Furthermore, Texas agriculture comm. Sid Miller visited (3/23) the Itamar settlement in the West Bank and announced the revival of a dormant exchange program between Israel and Texas for joint energy, trade, and agriculture projects, which Miller’s predecessor had allowed to lapse.“Israel and Texas share a deep bond based on the values of freedom, democracy, and the love of our land,” Miller said.“Increasing our economic cooperation will be good for the people of Texas and the people of Israel.” He also said it was time “the world recognizes that Judea and Samaria are legitimate” and a “mainstream part of the economy and the govt. of Israel.”

Although less successful in passing legislation, the BDS movement’s opponents in the U.S. Congress were also active this quarter. Sen. Cardin (D-MD) and Rep. Pete Roskam (R-IL) introduced the Israel Anti-Boycott Act on 3/23 in the Senate and House, respectively (see S. 720 and H.R. 1697 of 3/23/2017 at congressionalmonitor.org for details). The measure opposed the UNHRC’s 3/24/2016 creation of a database of Israeli settlement companies and any efforts to boycott those companies, and required the Export-Import Bank to consider BDS when reviewing potential credit applications. Both versions of the bill were referred to comm. and proceeded no further.

Anti-Semitism Crisis

In the wake of Trump’s election, a wave of more than 100 bomb threats targeting Jewish institutions across the world and desecrations of Jewish cemeteries across the U.S. sparked a minor diplomatic controversy and serious speculation about rising anti-Semitism. The controversy started when Israeli opposition leader Herzog called (2/27) on Netanyahu to prepare Israel for a massive wave of migrants fleeing anti-Semitism in the U.S. After some interpreted his comments as an attack on Trump, Herzog clarified (3/1) his statement at a Jewish People Policy Institute conference in Jerusalem, explaining that the wave of threats and attacks were a “red alert” that the Trump admin. “must deal with” and that “we should not feel guilty about it.” The following week, Trump called (3/6) Netanyahu to discuss the matter.

In a surprising turn of events, the Israeli police arrested (3/23) an Israeli-American youth nr. Ashqelon. The 18-year-old was allegedly the primary source of the bomb threats, which undermined the view that antiSemitism was on the rise and widespread. Later, Israel’s Ministry of Justice rejected a U.S. request to extradite the youth, likely because of the international nature of his crimes, according to a 4/23 report on Israel’s Channel 2. Israel and the U.S. generally maintain robust extradition protocols, and it was deemed unusual for Israel to deny the request. By the end of the quarter, it was unclear if the Trump admin. would press for the young man’s extradition.