Reflecting a yearlong trend of declining violence, the number of Palestinian and Israeli casualties decreased slightly this quarter (see JPS 46 [1–3]): 21 Palestinians were killed as a result of Israeli actions (down from 29 last quarter), and 1 Israeli was killed as a result of Palestinian actions (down from 5 last quarter). Therefore, the comprehensive death toll since the beginning of the 2d Intifada in 9/2000 reached 10,919 Palestinians (including 59 Palestinian citizens of Israel and 19 unidentified cross-border “infiltrators”); 1,260 Israelis (including at least 246 settlers and 434 Israel Defense Forces [IDF] soldiers and security personnel); and 73 foreign nationals (including 2 British suicide bombers). These numbers include individuals who died in noncombat-related incidents if their death was a direct result of Israel’s occupation or the ongoing conflict (e.g., ailing Palestinians who died while being denied access to medical care and Palestinians killed in smuggling tunnel accidents). They do include the 2 Palestinian citizens of Israel who died on 4/25 after triggering a piece of unexploded Israeli ordnance nr. Beersheba, but do not include the 3/24 killing of senior Hamas military commander Mazen Fuqaha. Despite Hamas officials’ allegations that Israeli forces were responsible, this had not been confirmed by the end of the quarter (see “Overview of the Violence” below).
Overview of the Violence
Apart from the outcry surrounding the Palestinian prisoners’ mass hunger strike at the end of the quarter (see “Palestinian Prisoners” below), there were fewer protests, clashes, and individual random attacks in the oPt this quarter. Therefore, the number of Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continued to decrease. Twelve Palestinians were killed as a result of Israeli actions in this context: 10 as a result of confrontations with Israeli forces, 1 by an Israeli settler after the Palestinian allegedly committed a stabbing attack, and 1 of kidney failure resulting from medical complications developed in Israeli prison. The number of Palestinian injuries, however, rose considerably this quarter: 724 Palestinians were injured as a result of Israeli actions between 2/21 and 5/15, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), up from 219 last quarter. Meanwhile, a mentally unstable Palestinian stabbed and killed a UK woman in East Jerusalem on 4/14 (he was arrested after the incident); Israeli forces shot and killed a Jordanian after he allegedly stabbed and injured an Israeli soldier outside Jerusalem’s Old City on 5/13; and a Palestinian driver killed an Israeli in an alleged ramming attack nr. Ramallah on 4/6.
Also of note: a special IDF court at Kirya military base, Tel Aviv, sentenced (2/21) Elor Azariya, the IDF sgt. who killed a Palestinian execution-style in c. Hebron on 3/24/2016, to 18 mos. in prison, the minimum sentence allowed under his 1/4 conviction on charges of manslaughter, and demoted him to the rank of private. His sentencewas substantially milder than the minimum sentence Israeli courts hand down to Palestinians convicted of throwing stones and firebombs, and even Ilan Katz, Azariya’s lawyer, admitted that the sentence was lenient. However, Israel’s ultranationalist and right-wing leaders, including PM Netanyahu (2/23), called on Israeli pres. Reuven Rivlin to pardon Azariya.
The number of Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip as a result of Israeli actions fell by about half this quarter, down to 7 (from 13): 3 died while attempting to repair a smuggling tunnel in s. Gaza on 2/24; 1 was killed by IDF artillery fire on 3/22; 1 fighter affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) succumbed to injuries sustained in an accident at a “resistance post” along the border on 4/26, according to the Gaza-based Health Ministry; 1 Hamas fighter died in a tunnel collapse on 4/17; and 1 fisherman succumbed to injuries sustained in a confrontation with Israeli naval forces on 5/15. The number of Gazans injured as a result of Israeli actions continued to fall this quarter; there were 13 reported injuries between 2/21 and 5/15, according to OCHA, down from 23 and 61 in each of the previous 2 quarters.
There was a slight increase in cross-border violence this quarter, placing in doubt the continuation of the cease-fire that has largely held since Israel’s assault on Gaza in the summer of 2014 (see JPS 44 [1, 2]). Nine days witnessed significant exchanges between armed fighters in Gaza and the IDF, leading to 1 Palestinian death (3/22), 8 injuries (2/27 [5], 3/7 [1], and 3/22 [2]), substantial damage to various Hamas and PIJ sites across Gaza, and minor damage to 1 Israeli military vehicle (3/2). After exchanges of rockets and air strikes on 2/27, 3/1, and 3/2, Asharq Al-Awsat reported (3/2) that Hamas had arrested hundreds of mbrs. of local Salafist groups since 12/2016, and that this could possibly explain the recent uptick in cross-border violence. Although no group took credit for the rocket fire on 2/27 or 3/1, Salafist groups were widely suspected of returning to a tactic they had used in response to a similar Hamas crackdown in 2015, i.e., launching rockets into Israel to draw Israeli retaliatory strikes on Hamas military sites (see JPS 45 [1]).
The IDF maintained its strict enforcement of Israel’s unilaterally defined buffer zone, or Access Restricted Areas, along Gaza’s border this quarter. IDF troops violently dispersed Palestinian protesters approaching the border on 3 occasions (2/24, 3/3, and 3/10); fired on Palestinian land or other property 11 times (2/19, 2/25, 3/19, 3/26, 3/28, 4/1, 4/3, 4/4, 4/18, 4/21, and 4/30); and fired on Palestinian shepherds, bird-hunters, and others 10 times (2/24, 3/3 [2], 3/6, 4/7, 4/14 [2], 4/21, 4/26, and 5/2), causing 3 injuries (2/24 [1] and 3/3 [2]). Israeli forces also arrested 10 Palestinians attempting to cross into Israel (3/3 [3], 3/13 [3], 3/17, 4/11 [2], and 4/13); conducted 22 limited incursions to level land along the border fence (2/23 [2], 3/1 [2], 3/5, 3/6, 3/15, 3/22, 4/5, 4/6 [2], 4/13, 4/16, 4/19, 4/20, 4/30, 5/2, 5/7 [2], 5/9, and 5/14 [2]); and sprayed herbicide on Palestinian lands along the border nr. Khan Yunis (4/4 and 4/5) and nr. Rafah (5/9).
After wavering on their promise to extend the fishing zone off Gaza’s coast during the previous 2 quarters, the Israeli authorities expanded the zone from 6 to 9 naut. mi. along Gaza’s s. coast on 5/3. However, before and after the extension, Israeli naval forces continued harassing Palestinian fishermen. They opened fire on or otherwise confronted Palestinian fishing boats on 52 occasions, down from 58 last quarter. Over the course of these incidents, they killed 1 fisherman (5/15); injured 2 (2/21 and 5/8), arrested 14 (2/21 [4], 3/23 [2], 4/30 [2], and 5/15 [6]); and confiscated at least 3 of the fishermen’s boats (3/23 and 5/15 [2]).
In addition to the usual violence across the border and along the coast, there was 1 major incident in Gaza this quarter. On 3/24, unidentified assailants shot and killed senior Hamas military official and former Israeli prisoner Fuqaha in s. Gaza City. Throughout the quarter, Hamas officials insisted that Israel was responsible and threatened to retaliate, but Israeli leaders denied these allegations, and no major escalation of violence ensued.
Within hours of the killing, Hamas released a statement implying that Israel was responsible. Thousands of Hamas mbrs. and supporters called for revenge at Fuqaha’s funeral on 3/25, and Hamas’s military wing, the Izzeddin al-Qassam Brigades (IQB), threatened to “respond in a matter that befits [Fuqaha’s] position.” As Hamas’s investigation into the killing progressed, the Gaza-based Interior Ministry shut down (3/26) the Erez border crossing with Israel, only allowing humanitarian cases, and barred (3/26) all Gazan fishermen from the sea indefinitely. A little over a mo. after the ministry lifted (4/6) the restrictions, Hamas announced (5/11) that it had arrested the person responsible for killing Fuqaha. The organization’s new leader, Ismail Haniyeh, described the arrested man as having “pulled the trigger following the instructions of his Israeli commanders,” doubling down on the allegation that Israel was responsible. Hamas then held (5/16) a press conference to announce that 3 Palestinians had confessed to their involvement in the killing and admitted to having received instructions from Israeli intelligence officers. The head of Hamas’s internal security forces, Tawfiq Abu Naim, said that the confession marked a “new stage” in Hamas’s dealings with Israel, but the Israelis didn’t respond to the evidence Hamas made public, nor were there any signs of Hamas retaliation.
Movement and Access
Apart from the extension of the fishing zone off Gaza’s s. coast (see “Overview of the Violence” above), there was only 1 significant change affecting Palestinian movement and access in the Gaza Strip this quarter. Humanitarian conditions continued to deteriorate, prompting numerous and increasingly urgent calls for a change in the status quo. In particular, the number of Palestinians permitted to exit Gaza continued to drop, from 26,317 in 11/2016–1/2017 to 18,056 in 2–4/2017, according to the Israeli NGO Gisha (see fig. 1). The greatest decrease registered was among merchants, highlighting the weakness of the Gazan economy according to a report in Haaretz (3/18). Many local industries were suffering from a lack of materials, such as wooden planks and boards, which Israel banned for security reasons, and fewer merchants had reasons to apply for exit permits as a result. As of 3/18, “only 1,363 traders have valid entry permits, a bit more than a third of the 3,600 permits Israel had approved in late 2015, and about a quarter of the quota set by Israel, which was never filled,” according to the Haaretz report. Citing the sputtering local economy, Gaza’s Ministry of National Economy announced (4/6) an increase in tariffs on 7 types of goods imported from Israel, including tahini and diapers. A ministry spokesperson explained (4/6) that the hope was that local producers would raise to 40% their market share on these products, up from approximately 15%, creating 500 new jobs.
Despite Pres. al-Sisi’s stated goal of opening the Rafah border crossing more frequently (see JPS 46 [3]), the Egyptian authorities kept it closed for all but 8 days this quarter, down from 17 and 21 days in each of the previous 2 quarters. According to OCHA, 5,004 Palestinians were able to return to Gaza and 2,054 were able to leave.
The IDF’s nr.-daily raids, house searches, and mobile checkpoints continued to obstruct Palestinian movement and access in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, although the Israeli crackdown on the habba (the surge of Palestinian resistance, random attacks, and protests that began in Jerusalem in 9/2015) included fewer village closures and other punitive restrictions this quarter. In the wake of a West Bank Palestinian’s stabbing and injuring of at least 4 people in Tel Aviv, the IDF’s Coordinator of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) suspended (3/23) single-day work permits granted to various enterprises bringing Palestinians into Israel. The alleged attacker in the Tel Aviv incident had obtained such a permit via Natural Peace Tours, a group that organizes personal interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.
The Israeli authorities maintained their practice of closing border crossings into the West Bank and Gaza around holidays (Purim [3/9–12], Passover [4/9–17], and Israel’s Independence Day [4/29–5/2]), with exceptions for humanitarian cases. In a related development, the Israeli authorities attempted to block the Palestinian “March of Return,” an annual protest held in parallel with Israel’s Independence Day celebrations, for the 1st time since the event’s founding 20 years earlier. Specifically, the Israeli police denied the marchers a permit, saying that there were not enough available officers to secure the event (Haaretz, 3/23). For their part, organizers said they toured the planned site of the march 2 weeks prior with Israeli police officers, and that they had agreed on the necessary requirements. “We’re sure there’s a political motive [to the reversal],” said the organizer’s atty. Wessam Areed. The Israeli police later reversed their ban provided that the route of the proposed demonstration be altered, allowing thousands of Palestinians to march at the site of al-Kabri village on 5/2. The Israeli authorities did ease 2 major restrictions on movement and access in the West Bank this quarter. First, a Palestinian source said (4/10) that COGAT had recently granted permits to 270 Palestinian businessmen, allowing them to drive their cars inside Israel for the 1st time since 2000. The source also said that more permits may be issued after 3 mos. if the program goes well. Second, the Israeli govt. and the PA signed (4/5) an agreement to allow Palestinian telecom companies to offer 3G services to their Palestinian customers in the oPt, ending a long-standing Israeli ban on the technology. The reversal was meant to stimulate the Palestinian economy, according to COGAT. The agreement came more than a year after the PA and COGAT had reached a similar deal, on 11/19/2015, that was never implemented. Palestinian commentators at that time had lamented the fact that Jawwal and Wataniya Mobile, the 2 major Palestinian telecom companies, were unlikely to invest in 3G when 4G, a more advanced technology, was already standard across most of the Middle East (see JPS 45 [3]). However, less than a week later, Wataniya CEO Durgham Maraee announced that the company had already started work on bringing 3G to the West Bank, and that Wataniya was planning to begin operations in Gaza soon, ending Jawwal’s 18-year monopoly in the region.
Access at Haram al-Sharif remained contentious this quarter, with both Palestinians and Israelis chafing against restrictions at the sanctuary. On 2/28, the Palestinian News and Information Agency (WAFA) reported that a magistrate’s court in Jerusalem had ruled that Jews should be permitted to pray at Haram al-Sharif, a move that would violate a key component of the status quo arrangement forged in the wake of Israel’s capture of Jerusalem in 1967 (see Doc. R6 in JPS 45 [1] for background on the status quo). Israel’s Ministry of Justice did not comment on the ruling, and the Jordanian govt., which administers the sanctuary, registered a formal protest with the Israeli govt. on 3/1. The Israeli govt. did not move to implement the ruling by the end of the quarter. At the end of 3/2017, Netanyahu decided to reassess his ban on Israeli MKs and ministers visiting Haram al-Sharif (Jerusalem Post, 3/27), a measure he had put in place in 10/2015 as the habba (surge) began (see JPS 45 [2]). Any change in the policy, however, would be delayed for 3 mos. to avoid provocations at the sanctuary during Passover and Ramadan. Meanwhile, Israeli forces banned more than 40 Palestinians from the sanctuary for periods of as long as 6 mos., to “keep the peace” in Jerusalem during the Jewish High Holidays. As a result, approximately 1,600 Jews visited during Passover, a significant increase over the 1,015 that visited during Passover in 2016, according to the Israeli pro-settler group Yirah.
The Israeli authorities plotted new restrictions on Palestinian tourism this quarter. On 4/23, the Border Control Dept. of Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority notified Israeli travel agencies that, as of 5/15, they would have to “attach, with each request to bring a group of tourists into the country, a special form pledging that they will not send tourists to [the West Bank].” It was unclear why the Israeli authorities thought such a move was necessary, but it was widely expected to deter foreign tourism to the oPt, thereby weakening the Palestinian economy. An Israeli tourism worker predicted that “if this takes effect, then groups of tourists looking for a down-to-earth vacation in Israel and visiting religious sites will have trouble paying the prices, and will stop coming.” Under pressure from tour group operators, Israel’s Ministry of Interior then froze (4/26) the order, explaining that “the draft of the letter that was sent out included some errors. . . . In the next few days, after the interior minister revisits the issue, we will be sending out a corrected version” (Haaretz, 5/3). By the end of the quarter, the ministry had issued no corrected version.
On 3/15, Israel’s High Court of Justice ordered the Interior Ministry to restore the residency status of a Palestinian, Akram Abd al-Haqq, who was born in East Jerusalem, but who had lived outside the city for 12 years. The ruling effectively challenged the govt.’s policy on awarding East Jerusalem Palestinians residency status. Previously, any Palestinians born in East Jerusalem who had been away from the city for at least 7 years lost their residency. Setting a new precedent, the justices decided that Palestinians born in East Jerusalem have a “strong affinity” with the city that must be taken into account in decisions on residency rights. Between 1967 and 2017, the Interior Ministry revoked the residency status of approximately 14,500 East Jerusalem Palestinians like Abd al-Haqq. Denials peaked at 4,577 in 2008, prompting a growing number of East Jerusalem Palestinians to seek Israeli citizenship, despite the stigma against it.
Palestinian Prisoners
On 4/17, Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti and approximately 1,500 of his fellow Palestinian prisoners embarked on a mass hunger strike, calling for “an end to [Israel’s] practice of arbitrary administrative detention, torture, ill-treatment, unfair trials, detention of children, medical negligence, solitary confinement, inhuman/degrading treatment, deprivation of basic rights such as family visits, and the right to education,” according to a statement released the same day. Various prisoners had conducted similar hunger strikes randomly in recent years, each one drawing the world’s attention to Israel’s carceral policies and galvanizing the Palestinian public (e.g., 2-time hunger striker Muhammad al-Qiq suspended his most recent action on 3/10; see JPS 46 [3]). The Dignity Strike, as Barghouti and his supporters dubbed their collective action (see Palestine Unbound), built on these efforts and won the backing of all the major Palestinian political parties, including Fatah’s traditional rivals, Hamas and PIJ.
The inevitable Israeli crackdown began even before the strike started. On 4/16, Barghouti published an op-ed in the New York Times in which he linked the poor conditions in Israel’s prisons with the Israeli occupation overall. Numerous pro-Israel readers and Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu, complained, and the Times later amended the online version of the op-ed to include a summary of the crimes for which Israel had sentenced Barghouti. Also, the Israel Prison Service (IPS) warned (4/16) that participating in the strike would result in “serious consequences”for those involved. The nature of those consequences became clear soon after the hunger strike started. First, the IPS suspended all family and lawyer visits, according to a source with the International Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC) on 4/18. Second, it moved Barghouti to solitary confinement and denied (4/18) his lawyers’ requests to visit him.
Meanwhile, Palestinians across the oPt organized nr.-daily rallies and other solidarity actions. Public and private institutions throughout the West Bank went on strike on 4/27. Employees of Jawwal and Paltel, another Palestinian telecom company, organized a sit-in in Ramallah on 4/30. The armed wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said (4/30) that it had launched “intensive cyberattacks” on sites and accounts “affiliated [with] the Zionist govt.” IQB published (5/3) a video threatening to make Israel “pay” unless the prisoners’ demands were addressed within 24 hours.
Although the strike did not capture the attention of the mainstream U.S. press, there were expressions of support elsewhere in the world. The Non-Aligned Movement denounced (4/22) Israel’s “illegal and oppressive” detention campaign. The ICRC announced (4/23) that it would consider the prisoners’ demand for increased family visits. The ICRC had coordinated 2 family visits per prisoner per mo. prior to 5/2016, but had decreased this to 1 per mo. due to an increase in family “no-shows” (see JPS 46 [1]). On 5/4, the Arab League called on the UN to send a commission of inquiry to “view the violations being committed against the prisoners of war.”
After the IPS responded to a legal challenge from the Israeli NGO Adalah and agreed (5/3) to let the prisoners meet with their lawyers, the Israeli authorities ramped up efforts to undermine the strikers. According to Israeli media reports (5/4), the IPS was allegedly attempting to bring in foreign doctors to replace the Israeli doctors refusing to forcefeed the prisoners (the Knesset passed a law authorizing force-feedings on 7/30/2015, but it was never implemented; see JPS 45 [1]). Despite rumors that the IPS was interested in negotiating with the strike’s leaders, the Israeli authorities focused their efforts on smearing Barghouti.
On 5/7, the IPS released footage allegedly showing the Palestinian leader eating cookies and candy bars in his cell at the Kishon detention center. The IPS did not say how Barghouti obtained the treats, but some IPS sources said (5/7) that the organization provided them to see if they could get him to break his strike. Various Palestinian groups and leaders, as well as Barghouti’s wife, Fadwa, denied that he had broken the strike and accused the IPS of fabricating the footage. “This was expected as part of the psychological and media war the IPS is conducting against the prisoners,” Barghouti’s lawyer said. “We can’t address the content of the clip so long as they don’t let us meet with Marwan. Let us visit him and then we will check the claims with him.” The IPS ultimately allowed an ICRC delegation to visit Barghouti on 5/11, but his lawyers were denied access until 5/14, despite the 5/3 agreement. Throughout its duration, the Israelis accused Barghouti of organizing the strike for personal reasons. “As we’ve said all along, the terrorists’ hunger strike isn’t about their prison conditions, but only about Barghouti’s desire to bolster his status in preparation for the day after [Abbas],” Erdan said (5/8), referring to the PA pres.’s stated desire to leave office. Erdan also published (5/15) a list of Barghouti’s alleged demands, including access to 20 television channels, air conditioning, and unlimited books and magazines. “The document shows how over the top the demands are,” he said. “No country in the world would enter into negotiations with prisoners for such demands, and certainly Israel, which is in a campaign against terror organizations, will not . . . surrender to extortion and damage its deterrent against terrorists.”
The head of the PA’s General Intelligence Service, Majid Faraj, and a delegation of senior intelligence officials met with their counterparts in the Shin Bet in an effort to negotiate a resolution, according to PA sources on 5/15. The same sources, however, said that Erdan was holding out, and by the end of the quarter, the IPS had not officially entered into talks with the prisoners.
Settler-Related Violence
Instances of settler-related violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem increased this quarter, with 34 incidents recorded in which Israeli settlers attacked Palestinians or their property, up from 20 the previous quarter, according to OCHA. Fifteen of these incidents resulted in Palestinian injuries, and 19 resulted in damage to Palestinian homes or other property. (See fig. 2 and Chronology for details.) These figures do not, however, include the settler killing of a Palestinian on 3/1 who broke into the settler’s home at a settlement outpost nr. Hebron (see Chronology for details).
Gaza’s Electricity Crisis
Three mos. after Qatar and Turkey stepped in to avert a major electricity crisis in Gaza in 1/2017 (see JPS 46 [3]), the fuel they had paid for ran out. Gaza’s sole power plant was forced to shut down on 4/16, plunging the region into darkness once again. The Gaza Electricity Distribution Company (GEDCO) said (4/17) that it would only be able to distribute 133 MW of power per day, far less than the 450–500 MW needed. As a result, Gazans endured 12-hour blackouts, with 6-hour periods of power in between.
As in 1/2017, intra-Palestinian politics were partly to blame for the crisis. The PA in Ramallah held Hamas accountable, with a spokesperson accusing (4/17) GEDCO of collecting electricity fees from Gaza’s residents amounting to more than $27 m. without contributing anything to the monthly purchases of electricity from Israel and Egypt. The PA paid approximately $11 m. to Israel and $2 m. to Egypt for the 120 MW and 13 MW, respectively, which they imported to Gaza each mo. Hamas, for its part, accused (4/16) the PA of causing the crisis. The Hamas-run Energy Authority’s dep. chair, Fathi Khalil, argued (4/16) that they would have been able to purchase sufficient fuel to power the plant using tax revenues collected in Gaza, “but this [became] unaffordable after the [PA] suddenly decided to impose full taxes on the fuel.” Before the imposition of new taxes, the energy authority in Gaza could buy enough diesel fuel from Israel to run 2 of the plant’s generators.
With intra-Palestinian tensions ratcheting up (see “Intra-Palestinian Politics” below), the electricity crisis deepened throughout the quarter. Gaza’s hospitals prepared for rolling blackouts to increase, according to the Palestinian media on 4/19. Israeli and Palestinian officials estimated (4/19) that their energy reserves would only be able to power backup generators for 48–72 hours. Various power lines feeding the Gaza grid from Egypt were disconnected (4/17) or damaged (4/20 and 4/24), according to GEDCO, forcing further cuts on Gaza’s residents. Then, in a drastic move, the PA informed (4/27) the Israeli govt. that it would no longer be paying for the electricity Israel supplied to Gaza. Sources said (4/24) that PA pres. Abbas was looking to step up the pressure on Hamas to give up control of Gaza, and this move appeared to be the 1st implementation of his new approach.
The intractability of internal Palestinian politics dampened the international community’s willingness to deliver more emergency aid. UN coordinator for humanitarian aid and development activities Robert Piper approved (4/27) the release of $500,000 to buy fuel for Gaza’s hospitals, but Qatar, Turkey, and all of the Palestinians’ other major patrons were silent.
Demolitions and Displacement
For the 3d quarter in a row, Israeli forces demolished fewer Palestinian structures in the West Bank and East Jerusalem than they had in the preceding quarter. Between 2/21 and 5/15, they demolished 73 structures, including 30 in Area C of the West Bank and 43 in East Jerusalem, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This marked a substantial decrease from the 155 structures that the IDF demolished last quarter (see JPS 46 [3]). The number of Palestinians displaced by these demolitions, however, went up to 205, from 161 the previous quarter.
There was only 1 reported instance of Israeli forces punitively demolishing Palestinian property during this quarter. On 3/22, the IDF sealed with concrete the Jabal Mukabir home of the Palestinian killed in a confrontation with Israeli soldiers on 1/7; 1 woman and 4 children were displaced (see Chronology).
In a related development, TheMarker reported (5/7) that Netanyahu and Finance Min. Moshe Kahlon agreed to a 2-year freeze on demolition orders for homes built without permits in Israel, primarily affecting Palestinian communities (see JPS 46 [3]). Several highprofile home demolitions in these communities sparked a wave of protests last quarter, and suspending the policy could have been seen as a victory in the Palestinians’ campaign for equal rights. However, Israel’s Dep. Atty. Gen. Erez Kaminitz denied (5/10) TheMarker’s report. “There was not, and there is not, any agreement by enforcement bodies to an all-encompassing freeze on enforcement against illegal construction,” he wrote. Notably, there were no high-profile demolitions of Palestinian property in Israel during the quarter, lending credence to TheMarker’s report.