In the wake of a deadly exchange of violence on 2/10 (see JPS 47 [3]), tensions along the Israel-Syria border remained high. The Israeli government was increasingly willing to take both military action against Iranian forces supporting the Syrian government as well as credit for the attacks. Against a backdrop of growing uncertainty around the U.S. presence in Syria, and its commitment to the 7/14/2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; see “Iran” below), the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a series of missions targeting Iranian troops and infrastructure in Syria this quarter. The campaign culminated in major attacks on 4/9, 4/29, and in the immediate aftermath of U.S. president Trump’s decision to pull the United States out of the deal on 5/8.
Just six days after a drone flew (2/10) from Syria into Israel and the Israelis retaliated with air strikes on 12 Syrian and Iranian targets in southern Syria, Prime Minister Netanyahu met (2/16) with UN secretary-general Guterres and protested Iranian activities in Syria. He said that Israel would not allow Iran to establish a military presence in close proximity to its territory and warned that the Israeli army would act against any attempt to do so. Two days later, he again threatened military action in a speech at the Munich Security Conference. Holding a piece of the aforementioned drone, he said, “We will act if necessary not just against Iran’s proxies but against Iran itself.”
After a relatively uneventful 3/2018, Trump shocked the international community and many in his administration when he announced, at a rally on 3/29, that a U.S. withdrawal from Syria was imminent. “We’re knocking the hell out of ISIS,” he said. “We’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now.” Although State Department officials later clarified that they were unaware of any withdrawal plans, the Israeli prime minister was clearly concerned. He spoke with Trump by phone on 4/3, and according to a White House statement, Trump “reiterated the commitment of the United States to Israel’s security and the two leaders agreed to continue their close coordination on countering Iran’s malign influence and destabilizing activities.” Two White House officials described the call as “tense.”
Events in early 4/2018 tested the purported U.S. resolve. First, there were reports of a chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Duma, outside Damascus, on 4/7 when some 40 people died of symptoms consistent with chemical weapons. Although Syrian state media denied that any such attack had taken place and it was unclear who was responsible, the reports put Trump in the position of having to respond. (He ordered a military strike against Syrian forces after a similar attack was reported in 4/2017). Second, Israel conducted air strikes on an airbase outside Homs on 4/9, killing 14 people, allegedly including at least 7 Iranians.
The strikes on 4/9, made without Israel first informing the Russian government, exacerbated existing tensions between the major international players in the Syrian conflict. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called (4/9) the Israeli strikes a “dangerous development,” and the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned (4/10) the Israeli ambassador for questioning. Russian president Vladimir Putin reportedly called Netanyahu (4/11) and urged him not to take any further steps against Iran in Syria. With the prospect of a Russian response looming, Trump worked with the United Kingdom and France to organize and execute (4/13) air strikes on Syrian government research, storage, and military targets near Homs and in Damascus on 4/13. The strikes, which caused unspecified damage and casualties, prompted the Russian ambassador to the United States to threaten “consequences.” However, the attack was widely seen as limited in order not to provoke Russia into escalating the conflict any further.
Iran and Israel, meanwhile, made explicit threats to do just that. After an unnamed Israeli official admitted (4/16) that Israel was responsible for the 4/9 attack, a spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry said (4/16), “The occupying Zionist regime will, sooner or later, receive an appropriate response to its actions.” Israeli defense minister Lieberman countered (4/16) that Israel would not allow Russia to impose constraints on its response to any Iranian counterattack from Syria. “We will not allow Iranian consolidation in Syria,” he added. At the same time, Lieberman said that Israeli diplomats were in constant contact with their Russian counterparts to ease “friction” over their opposing stances on Syria.
Two weeks after the joint U.S., UK, and French strikes in Syria, the Israelis attacked again, conducting air strikes on Syrian army facilities near Hama and north of the Aleppo International Airport late at night on 4/29; 26 people were killed, including at least 11 Iranian troops, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). U.S. officials later said (5/2) that the strike came after Iranian forces transferred a shipment of anti-aircraft missiles to one of the targeted facilities. One source claimed that some 200 missiles were destroyed (New York Times, 4/30). The strike ratcheted up tensions to the point that a senior U.S. official stated, “On the list of the potentials for most likely live hostility around the world, the battle between Israel and Iran in Syria is at the top” (NBC News, 5/2).
Trump’s 5/8 decision to pull the United States out of the 7/14/2015 JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran sparked another exchange of cross-border violence. Within an hour of the announcement, Israeli forces attacked a military base south of Damascus known to house Iranian troops; 15 people were killed, including 8 Iranians, according to SOHR. The Israeli army also went on high alert and instructed local authorities in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights to prepare bomb shelters. The long-awaited Iranian counterattack came the next day. Iranian forces fired (5/9) approximately 20 Grad and Fajr-5 rockets toward Israel. Most fell short of the border, and the remaining few were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system. Israel’s air force then retaliated again, bombing dozens of Iranian weapons storage, logistics, and intelligence sites across Syria. According to SOHR, 27 people were killed, including 19 Iranians. Later, Israeli sources called the barrage the largest Israeli military operation in Syria since 1974. The Syrian army claimed that only three people had been killed but acknowledged that the strikes marked a “new phase” of direct conflict with Israel.
Also of note: The Israeli government lifted its gag order on the Israeli press reporting that Israel was responsible for the bombing of a Syrian nuclear facility in 9/2007 (see JPS 37 [2]). Although it was widely known that Israel was behind the attack, this marked the first time the Israeli government openly admitted it. “The courageous decision of the Israeli government almost 11 years ago [. . .] sends a clear message,” Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz tweeted (3/21).
Devastation in Yarmouk Refugee Camp
For the first time in two years (see JPS 45 [4]), there was a surge of violence in Yarmouk refugee camp outside Damascus. Once home to the largest concentration of Palestinian refugees in Syria and approximately 160,000 residents overall, the camp’s population plummeted after the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011. According to UNRWA, only around 12,000 residents remained this quarter, including approximately 6,200 Palestinian refugees. With humanitarian conditions in the camp already dire, renewed fighting put residents at further risk.
In what the Syrian government claimed was an effort to retake territory under ISIS control and solidify control over the area around Damascus, Syrian army troops began an “intensive bombardment” of Yarmouk refugee camp on 4/19, according to a 4/24 report at the Electronic Intifada. After five straight days of fighting in the camp, the PLO called (4/23) for an end to the bombing. “The humanitarian situation in Yarmouk and surrounding areas has long been very harsh and is rapidly deteriorating,” said an UNRWA spokesperson on 4/25. “Supplies of food and medicine are running low. There is no running water and very little electricity. Healthcare options are limited and there are no doctors remaining in the area.”
However, the fighting continued. By the end of 4/2018, the Syrian army had retaken approximately 60 percent of the camp and approximately 3,500 Palestinian refugees were able to escape (Al Jazeera, 4/29). At the same time, the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria reported (5/1) that at least 15 civilians had been killed since 4/19. A small armed group, Tahrir al-Sham, an al-Qaeda affiliate, agreed (5/1) to evacuate the approximately 15 percent of the camp it controlled and to retreat to Idlib province, but it was unclear if the violence would ebb by the end of the quarter.