Quarterly Updates for (16 May 2016 — 15 Aug 2016)

Seven mos. after resuming in 11/2015 (see JPS 45 [3]), the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation process culminated in a formal agreement this quarter. The 2 sides overcame the remaining sticking points hampering the talks—Turkey’s demand that Israel ease its blockade on Gaza and Israel’s demand that Turkey stop enabling Hamas (see JPS 45 [4]). Champions of the deal on both sides faced significant obstacles in shepherding the final agreement through.

At the end of last quarter, the negotiations had been postponed indefinitely amid a reshuffle in Turkey’s political leadership. About 3 weeks after PM Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned on 5/5, his replacement, Binali Yildirim, took office. Israel viewed the move as a positive sign for the reconciliation process, given Yildirim’s reputation as a close ally of Turkish pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The new PM reinforced that perception when he said (5/24) that his govt. would be pursuing a new foreign policy based on having “more friends than enemies.”

Over the next mo., other announcements and comments by Turkish and Israeli officials provided further indications that the new govt. would back reconciliation. On 5/30, PM Netanyahu told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation that a deal with Turkey was very close. Sources involved in the meeting reported him as saying that he was waiting for Ankara to set a date for a final, decisive meeting. On the same day, Turkish dep. PM Numan Kurtulmuş said that 2 of Turkey’s 3 major conditions had been met, without specifying what these were. Then, Erdoğan removed 2 senior officials close to the talks: Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu was promoted from undersecy. for foreign affairs to UN amb. while Hakan Fidan, a known opponent of the talks and the head of Turkey’s national intelligence organization, was made amb. to Japan. Israeli diplomatic officials said (6/4) that Sinirlioğlu was the chief Turkish architect of the talks and that his promotion, along with Fidan’s removal, signaled Erdoğan’s confidence that the final deal was imminent (YNet, 6/4).

International and regional opposition to the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation receded in early 6/2016. In a meeting with Netanyahu, Russian pres. Vladimir Putin reversed (6/7) Moscow’s earlier position, saying he now “welcome[d]” Turkish-Israeli rapprochement as a “positive matter.” Russian-Turkish relations had been strained since Turkish forces downed a Russian jet over Syria in 11/2015, and Putin had reportedly been wary of Erdoğan’s gathering stature as a result of improving relations with Israel. Although Turkey’s efforts to mollify Hamas were not as productive, Hamas did not upend the momentum toward a deal. On 6/22, Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that his deputies would continue meeting with Hamas officials in the context of their broader efforts to promote peace in the region, notwithstanding the reconciliation talks with Israel. He also said that Turkey’s relationship with Hamas was not an obstacle to the process. Not long after, however, a dispute emerged between the 2 over Ankara’s pledge to get Israel to loosen its siege on Gaza. The dispute did not escalate beyond allegations and counter-allegations, however. Also, Erdoğan met (6/24) with Hamas leader Khalid Mishal 2 days before a round of IsraeliTurkish talks were scheduled, and while no details were released, the 2 reportedly discussed the blockade on Gaza and the upcoming negotiations.

Ultimately, officials announced a final agreement in Rome on 6/27, concluding the 9-mo. Israeli-Turkish reconciliation process. According to an Israeli official on 6/26, a compromise on the final sticking point—Hamas activities in Turkey—was reached 10 days earlier when the Turkish govt. pledged to allow Hamas to operate in Turkey only for diplomatic purposes, and not to use the country as a staging ground for military activity against Israel. The rest of the deal included: the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations; the resumption of bilateral talks on military cooperation and intelligence sharing; Ankara’s agreement to drop its demands for Israel to lift its blockade on Gaza; Turkey resuming aid to Gaza; Israel allowing Turkey to build a new power plant, desalination plant, and hospital in Gaza; Israel transferring more than $20 m. to a Turkish humanitarian fund for the families of Turkish nationals injured or killed in the IDF assault on the Gaza aid flotilla in 5/2010 (see JPS 40 [1]); and Turkey terminating all legal proceedings related to the flotilla attack. The 2 sides also agreed to begin talks on the prospects for building a gas pipeline in the e. Mediterranean.

Both sides moved quickly to implement the agreement. After the dir. gen. of Israel’s Foreign Ministry signed it on 6/28, the Israeli security cabinet approved the agreement the next day, with only 3 ministers voting against (DM Lieberman, Education Minister Bennett, and Justice Minister Shaked). On 7/1, the Lady Leyla set sail with 11,000 tons of humanitarian aid for Gaza; it berthed in Ashdod on 7/3, and its contents were shipped overland to Gaza over the next 2 days.

Meanwhile, Hamas’s leadership presented a united front in favor of the deal, releasing a statement on 6/27 expressing gratitude to the Turkish govt. for its efforts to ease the blockade on Gaza. But there were reports of mixed reactions on the part of Hamas. Some cited officials criticizing Turkey for “normalizing” the blockade on Gaza; others denied the Turkish allegation that Hamas’s leadership approved the agreement in advance.

Before its parliament could ratify the deal, however, Turkey witnessed an attempted coup on 7/15. In Istanbul, soldiers occupied Taksim Square, jets flew low over key bridges, and approximately 200 people were killed in the fighting. Eventually, forces loyal to the govt. prevailed. Erdoğan announced that he was back in full control early on 7/16, and proceeded with a widespread crackdown against opponents. Both Hamas and the Israeli govt. expressed support for the Turkish govt. in the wake of the coup, and senior Turkish and Israeli officials pledged (7/17) that the attempted coup would not hinder their reconciliation.

By the end of the quarter, the process, though delayed, remained firmly on track. On 8/12, Çavuşoğlu said that the Turkish parliament would ratify the deal before going on recess in mid-8/2016 and the Israeli govt. was reportedly waiting for the ratification to appoint a new amb. to Turkey (Jerusalem Post, 8/3).